Schmidt v. City of Pasadena: PREP Act Immunity Barred the Employee's Testing and Masking Claims

In Schmidt v. City of Pasadena, No. 25-488 (9th Cir. Oct. 5, 2026), the Ninth Circuit affirmed dismissal of a city employee's claims arising from workplace COVID-19 testing and masking requirements. The controlling ground was PREP Act immunity on the allegations and countermeasures before the court. The opinion did not decide that every workplace health policy is lawful or that every religious-accommodation claim fails.

The court filed its published opinion on October 5, 2026.

An exemption from vaccination did not eliminate the policy dispute

Pasadena's 2021 policy required vaccination or an approved medical or religious exemption. Jonathan Schmidt, a forensic specialist in the police department, received a religious exemption but remained subject to testing and masking requirements. After unpaid administrative leave for refusing those requirements, he complied and returned to work. He alleged resulting harm, including disclosure of his unvaccinated status, until the city rescinded the policy in March 2022. Slip op. at 5–6.

Several amended complaints followed. The district court dismissed the action and denied reconsideration based on material Schmidt characterized as new. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo and could affirm on a ground supported by the record. Id. at 6–8. Its ruling applied to the pleaded claims; it was not a trial finding resolving every disputed factual assertion.

The immunity analysis required three separate connections

The PREP Act can protect covered persons against suit and liability for specified losses causally related to administering or using covered countermeasures. Its operation depends on the statute and the applicable HHS declaration. The court first determined that the alleged November 2021–March 2022 conduct fell within the relevant effective period. Id. at 8–11.

It then addressed covered persons, covered countermeasures, and the causal connection between the countermeasures and claimed loss. The city qualified as a program planner because it administered the policy, and the individual defendants also fell within the covered-person framework on the allegations before the court. Id. at 11–13.

This was a countermeasure-immunity inquiry, not a general conclusion that municipal employment removes constitutional rights. The identity of the defendant, actual activity, applicable authorization, dates, and claimed injury each mattered.

Product authorization could not be replaced by a categorical assumption

The court examined the testing and mask authorizations, rejecting Schmidt's characterization of the diagnostic authorization as excluding the collection method at issue. It also found the mask requirement within the applicable declaration and authorization. Id. at 13–17.

Importantly, the opinion did not treat an earlier case's statement about COVID tests as a rule that every test automatically qualifies. That earlier statement reflected a concession by the parties in that case. Sufficient factual allegations remain necessary to establish entitlement to immunity. Id. at 16 n.2. For another dispute, the actual product and authorization cannot be replaced by the generic word “testing.”

The type of loss mattered more than the cause-of-action label

The district court had treated different pleaded legal theories differently for immunity purposes. Drawing on the Tenth Circuit’s reasoning in Dressen v. AstraZeneca AB, the Ninth Circuit explained that the statutory causation inquiry concerns the alleged loss and its relationship to administering or using a countermeasure, rather than merely the label assigned to a claim. Schmidt alleged physical and emotional harm and loss of property resulting from compliance with the policy; those allegations satisfied the connection on this record. Id. at 17–20.

The panel assumed without deciding that Schmidt had a property interest in the saliva samples. It did not recognize a new property right in DNA. Id. at 19. Nor did its analysis establish the merits of each underlying constitutional or state-law theory. Because immunity resolved the case, the panel declined to reach the merits of his other arguments. Id. at 20 n.4.

Reconsideration did not supply a way around the dismissal

The panel also upheld denial of reconsideration. The submitted material had been available before the prior dismissal, and some had already been presented. Calling it new did not establish a qualifying basis for reconsideration. The court rejected the remaining recusal and sanctions arguments and affirmed. Id. at 20–23.

That procedural ruling should not be turned into a general prohibition on reconsideration. The relevant inquiry concerned the actual grounds asserted and the prior availability of the material in this case.

What the decision leaves for a current employment review

Begin with the policy version, actual dates, exemption decision, product or testing records, applicable authorizations, and each alleged loss. Separate a challenge to a covered countermeasure from another employment decision rather than assuming that one label resolves all possible claims. Whether another case satisfies the statute, declaration, and causal requirements needs its own analysis.

The religious-accommodation guide addresses a different question: Actual duties and available workplace alternatives. The Loudermill analysis concerns pretermination procedure where a protected employment interest exists. Neither framework can be substituted for the PREP Act issue Schmidt decided. For a specific dispute, the employment-law practice can review the complete policy and litigation record, including later docket developments.