Larson v. Moraga Orinda Fire District: Why This Trail-Running Injury Was Compensable

Larson v. Moraga Orinda Fire District, No. ADJ17881925 (WCAB July 29, 2024), illustrates why an off-duty athletic-injury claim turns on the actual activity and employment record. The Board denied the employer’s petition for reconsideration, preserving an award for a firefighter’s left ankle and foot injury sustained while trail running. The result rested on a reasonable expectation of this form of conditioning, not on an automatic exception for public-safety employees.

“applicant met his burden of establishing both elements”

Larson, slip op. at 2

The statute and the disputed expectation

Labor Code section 3600(a)(9) addresses voluntary off-duty recreational, social and athletic activities that are outside work duties. Its exceptions include activities reasonably expected by the employment or expressly or impliedly required. Applying Ezzy v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board, 146 Cal. App. 3d 252, 260 (1983), the Board asked both whether Larson believed the activity was expected and whether that belief was objectively reasonable. Larson, slip op. at 2.

The employer challenged the objective component. It emphasized that it did not direct Larson to trail run, provided compensated exercise time and equipment, and did not require preparation for a recurring fitness test, promotion or specialty team. The question was therefore more demanding than whether running generally improved physical fitness.

Why the terrain and supervisor testimony mattered

Larson had trained with the U.S. Forest Service and Cal Fire, where trail running prepared firefighters for wildland conditions. His current district responded to wildfires and provided mutual aid. He described steep and changing terrain encountered on assignments and explained how his preferred trail replicated those demands. His running routine was known to coworkers and his captain. Larson, slip op. at 2–3.

Captain Costanza testified that firefighters needed off-duty training to perform their work adequately. The unit discussed workout plans; he knew about Larson’s trail running and considered it suited to their work. Trail runs were not feasible while on duty. This testimony linked the particular activity to the district’s needs and supported Larson’s account of what was expected.

The Board rejected the suggestion that the statutory exception was limited to training for a required test or advancement opportunity. It relied on Wilson v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board, 196 Cal. App. 3d 902 (1987), for the importance of employer encouragement and the fact that lack of payment, equipment or supervision is not necessarily decisive. Larson, slip op. at 3–4.

The contrary facts remained part of the analysis

The adopted report described on-duty exercise time, department facilities, the lack of a prescribed off-duty program and Larson’s history of competitive running. He was registered for the Dipsea race but denied that he was specifically training for it when injured. These facts created a genuine personal-activity argument; the decision did not erase them. Adopted report at 6–10.

The report distinguished decisions rejecting basketball or other conditioning claims where the necessary activity-specific nexus was absent. It also considered testimony that the employer had directed another captain to file a claim for an off-duty gym injury and that the claim was accepted. That conduct informed the expectations analysis. It was not treated as a universal promise covering every exercise chosen by every firefighter. Report at 9–14.

What the decision establishes—and its boundary

The Board concluded that Larson’s subjective belief was supported by an objectively reasonable employment expectation. Section 3600(a)(9) therefore did not bar compensability on this record, and the May 3, 2024 findings and award remained undisturbed. The July 29 order denied reconsideration; it did not merely send the matter back for more evidence.

This ordinary panel decision is persuasive authority rather than an en banc or appellate holding binding other cases. General physical demands alone do not resolve the statutory test. Different employer communications, an expressly excluded sport, a different activity or weaker evidence connecting the workout to actual duties can materially change the analysis.

The practical value is its evidentiary detail: Prior training explained the worker’s belief, current operational duties gave that belief context, and supervisor testimony connected the particular exercise to the employer. Mishra X’s guide to preserving off-duty workout evidence translates those distinctions into a record-gathering task without assuming the same outcome.

Practical implications of the decision

For workers, the decision makes the activity-specific employment connection worth documenting: Who discussed the routine, what operational demands it served and why the worker understood it was expected. For employers, on-duty facilities and personal athletic goals belong in the same record. The Board assessed that combined evidence rather than treating either fact as conclusive.

Questions about this issue

Why did trail running matter in Larson?

The worker and captain connected the specific activity and terrain to wildfire duties and the employer’s conditioning expectations.

Did the Board require a mandatory fitness test?

No. It rejected limiting the statutory exception to preparation for a test, promotion or specialty team.

Did reconsideration lead to a remand?

No. The employer’s petition was denied and the compensability findings were left undisturbed.

Read the primary source: Larson v. Moraga Orinda Fire District — filed order PDF.