Fontenot: A Post-Termination Defense Failed on the Injury Date and Earlier Medical Records

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An employer could not use the post-termination defense against a cumulative injury claim because the worker’s injury date came after her termination and, separately, medical records from before the termination already showed the injury. In Alena Michelle Fontenot v. Optum Services, Inc., No. ADJ19513880 (Cal. WCAB Nov. 13, 2026), the Appeals Board denied the employer’s petition for reconsideration and left in place a finding of industrial injury. The judge had permissibly relied on the treating physician instead of a panel qualified medical evaluator (QME) whose no-injury opinion rested on a mistaken history. How much disability she has remains undecided.

The panel (Commissioners Capurro, Kelly and Williams Dodd) denied reconsideration for the reasons in the trial judge’s report.

An injury finding the employer challenged

Alena Michelle Fontenot claimed a cumulative injury while employed by Optum Services, Inc. After a June 17, 2026 trial, the judge’s August 17, 2026 Findings of Fact found that her injury arose out of and in the course of employment, and Optum sought reconsideration (pages 1 to 3).

The judge relied on reports by the primary treating physician, F. Marina Russman, M.D., finding industrial injury to the cervical, thoracic and lumbar spine, left knee, left leg, both wrists, both hands and fingers. Dr. Russman’s findings rested on a physical examination with range-of-motion measurements, Fontenot’s own account and MRI studies, though her wrist and hand findings did not reference the MRIs (pages 4 and 5). A report by Anthony Francisco, Ph.D., found work to be the predominant cause of a psychological injury (page 4).

Two separate ways around the post-termination bar

Labor Code section 3600(a)(10) limits claims filed after a notice of termination or layoff for an injury before that notice, unless the worker proves one of the listed conditions. Our guide to a claim after a layoff or closure walks through that list. The judge found two of them here, and either one defeated the defense.

The injury date came after termination. For a cumulative injury, section 5412 sets the date of injury as the date the worker first suffered disability and knew, or reasonably should have known, that the work caused it. The judge found that “considering Applicant’s training, intelligence and circumstances, she reasonably should not have known that her condition was work related until after termination.” An injury date after the notice of termination is an exception under section 3600(a)(10)(D) (page 3).

Earlier medical records showed the injury. Section 3600(a)(10)(B) also excepts a claim when the worker’s medical records from before the notice contain evidence of the injury. The QME’s own record review listed such records. A November 29, 2022 report by Richard Butlig, M.D., documented pain and stiffness from the mid-lower back to the bottom of the left foot, with numbness and tingling every day. January 2024 reports by a nurse practitioner documented left hip, buttock and neck pain since November 2023. For the psychological injury, the list included a September 6, 2018 report by Tatyana Sarkisova, M.D., documenting major depressive disorder and Zoloft use since 2013; the judge noted that the diagnosis predated the death of Fontenot’s daughter and that the report mentioned work stress without presenting work as the cause. The judge then called the list “multiple medical records existing prior to the notice of termination” (page 3).

Our note: Fontenot’s claim included a psychological injury, and the report analyzed the whole defense under section 3600(a)(10). That section opens with “Except for psychiatric injuries governed by subdivision (e) of Section 3208.3,” and section 3208.3(e) has its own post-termination test, as our Thorn analysis explains. A worker with a psychiatric claim filed after termination should expect that test to be applied to it.

Why the judge did not follow the QME

The judge may choose among conflicting medical reports and rely on the one the judge finds most persuasive, citing the California Supreme Court’s decision in Jones v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1968) 68 Cal.2d 476. Here the conflict was between the panel QME, Lee Woods, M.D., and Dr. Russman (pages 3 and 4).

Dr. Woods found no injury, reasoning that Fontenot worked from November 1, 2012 to February 22, 2024 without reporting an injury, seeking treatment or needing time off. Her own testimony confirmed that she never reported an injury. But the records showed treatment and time off work: Dr. Butlig’s June 7, 2021 report found her not ready to return to work, and his April 25, 2022 report documented treatment for the same body parts. The judge wrote: “The undersigned WCJ is baffled as to Dr. Woods’ conclusion that Applicant never sought treatment” (page 4).

Dr. Woods also relied on Dr. Butlig’s finding of no objective findings in 2018. Yet Dr. Woods’ own examination recorded limited range of motion in the neck, thoracic spine, shoulder, wrist and fingers. In the judge’s words, “the neck shows approximately 12% whole person impairment, the lumbar spine shows approximately 11% whole person impairment.” Because Fontenot kept working after 2018, the judge reasoned: “If there was no impairment in 2018, then work is the only documented cause of the present impairment” (page 4).

In denying reconsideration, the Board added that “the relevant and considered opinion of one physician may constitute substantial evidence, even if inconsistent with other medical opinions,” citing Place v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd. (1970) 3 Cal.3d 372, 378–379 (page 5). Our Read analysis shows the same principle applied to a choice between two ratings.

What the denial leaves open

The finding is that Fontenot was injured at work, not how much disability she has. The judge’s report keeps the record open on nature and extent and states that “Dr. Woods may correct the deficiencies in his report and may be able to justify 100% apportionment to non-industrial causes.” The same applies if Optum seeks a psychological panel (page 5). The Board’s order denied the petition (page 6).

What Fontenot means for a claim filed after a job ends

Our reading: A post-termination defense is only as strong as the timeline behind it. Two kinds of evidence decided this case. First, records showing what the worker knew and when; a worker who did not connect her symptoms to her job until after termination may have a later injury date. Second, treatment records from before the notice that describe the injured body parts, even if the worker never filed a report. Those same records can expose a QME whose opinion rests on an incomplete history. Because either exception was enough, the defense would have needed a record that knocked out both: proof that her injury date—when she first had disability and knew or should have known that work caused it—fell before the notice, and no medical records from before the notice showing the injury.

Filed a claim after losing your job?

Bring your termination or layoff notice, the date you filed your claim, and every medical record from before the notice, including visits where a doctor took you off work, along with any QME report. We can check whether the records support an exception to the post-termination defense. Call (949) 343-9735 or email office@mishrax.com.