Evans: Medical-Leave Knowledge Did Not Fill Missing Discrimination Allegations

An employer’s knowledge of medical leave and a later termination can be important facts. They do not identify, by themselves, which legal claim is being asserted or what facts connect the challenged action to discrimination. A January 9, 2026 order in Evans v. First Student, Inc., No. 3:25-CV-00037 (KAD), illustrates that distinction at the pleading stage—and the separate consequence of abandoning one claim when responding to a motion.

The District of Connecticut’s memorandum of decision granted a motion directed at three of five counts. The race-discrimination and FMLA-retaliation counts were not targeted or resolved by this order. It applied Connecticut employment-discrimination law and federal pleading rules. It is a district-court decision outside California, not controlling California or Ninth Circuit authority and not a statement of California’s FEHA standards.

A partial motion required a claim-by-claim reading

Evans alleged that he had worked for First Student since 1994, was 55 years old, suffered strokes, took approved FMLA leave, and returned to full duties. He also alleged disputed attendance discipline, a later accusation involving a company vehicle, suspension, and termination. At this stage, the court accepted the complaint’s factual allegations as true for purposes of the dismissal motion. It did not find after trial that the alleged misconduct occurred or that the employer’s account was correct. Evans, slip op. at 1–3.

The complaint contained perceived-disability discrimination, race discrimination, age discrimination, FMLA interference, and FMLA retaliation counts. The motion addressed the disability, age, and interference counts. The race and FMLA-retaliation counts were not targeted or resolved by this order. Saying that the court rejected every discrimination or FMLA claim would therefore misstate its scope.

The perceived-disability theory needed supporting factual links

In opposing dismissal, Evans framed the disability claim as discrimination based on an employer’s perception of disability. The court therefore examined whether the allegations plausibly supported that theory, rather than deciding that a stroke could never constitute a disability. Its footnote expressly declined to decide the sufficiency of allegations of an actual medical disability. Evans, slip op. at 4–6 & n.1.

The court found the employer’s knowledge of the strokes and approved leave insufficient, on this complaint, to establish the necessary perceived-disability and causation inferences. General statements that a supervisor wanted Evans fired or regarded him as problematic were not connected to a medical condition. The allegations also did not link the challenged discipline to the employer’s alleged perception of disability. This was a conclusion about the facts pleaded under the theory presented, not a finding that taking protected leave eliminates discrimination protection.

Age supplied a protected characteristic, but not the missing connection

The age count identified Evans’s age but did not add nonconclusory facts supporting an inference that the challenged conduct occurred because of age. The opposition’s reference to age-related infirmities did not supply the missing factual link. The court also declined to assume that strokes themselves supported an inference of age discrimination. Evans, slip op. at 6–8.

That reasoning should not be converted into a rule that medical conditions and age can never intersect in a discrimination case. The narrower point is to identify what the actual allegations say about the decision, the relevant actors, and the asserted protected characteristic. A label in the count heading does not replace those factual allegations.

The FMLA-interference count ended through abandonment

Evans expressly did not contest dismissal of the interference count and did not brief it in opposition. The court dismissed that count as abandoned. It did not decide the merits of every possible interference theory or rule that FMLA leave had no legal effect. The separate FMLA-retaliation count remained outside the motion addressed in this decision. Evans, slip op. at 8–9.

This distinction matters when reading a dismissal order or preparing a response. Identify each challenged count, the ground asserted against it, and the response actually made. A court’s disposition of an unopposed claim cannot automatically be used as a substantive answer to a different claim that the motion did not reach.

Use the decision as a pleading example, with its limits intact

Evans illustrates three separate analytical tasks: Identifying the disability theory actually presented, connecting age or perceived disability to the challenged action through pleaded facts, and addressing each count challenged by a motion. It does not establish the eventual outcome of the entire lawsuit, a trial finding about the employment events, or a California accommodation rule.

Our employment practice addresses California employment disputes under the law applicable to their own records. For a separate evidentiary setting, the Hussey analysis concerns a Ninth Circuit summary-judgment record and conduct preceding internal complaints. That different procedural posture should not be collapsed into the complaint-sufficiency questions resolved here.