Anderson: A Tax Court Loss on Legal Fees Barred the Same Refund Claim for Earlier Years

A couple who lost a Tax Court case over whether a husband’s legal fees were deductible business expenses for 2013 and 2014 could not try the same question again in a refund suit for 2011 and 2012. The Court of Federal Claims held them collaterally estopped, meaning bound by the earlier decision, because they showed no change in the law and no material difference in the facts between the years.
Judge Schwartz decided Anderson v. United States, No. 18-1133T (Fed. Cl. Nov. 9, 2026), an opinion designated for publication, and granted the government summary judgment. The court added that it could not treat the husband’s final criminal conviction as wrong, so his claim of innocence could not change the answer.
The deduction the Andersons claimed
William French Anderson is a physician and geneticist. In 2006 a California jury convicted him of sexually abusing a minor; the conviction was affirmed and has withstood two decades of post-conviction challenges, and the November 9 opinion reports that a state petition claiming actual innocence was pending. He contends he was the victim of a scheme by the Chinese government to frame him and steal his intellectual property in a cancer drug. On that theory, the Andersons argued that fees paid to his habeas lawyer from 2011 through 2014 were ordinary and necessary business expenses under section 162. Opinion pages 1–2.
Whether legal fees are business expenses depends on the origin and character of the claim that produced them, the test our Gilmore analysis explains. For 2011 and 2012, the Andersons paid the assessed tax, filed amended returns claiming the fees as arising from his trade or business, and sued in the Court of Federal Claims after the IRS denied the refunds. Opinion pages 2–4.
What the Tax Court had already decided
For 2013 and 2014, the Andersons had petitioned the Tax Court. That court ruled that it could not redetermine Dr. Anderson’s guilt and then held that the conduct behind the conviction was personal, occurring at the couple’s home and arising from a personal relationship, so the fees’ link to his business was only “tangential.” It found the fees were spent pursuing a state habeas appeal, not investigating the alleged sabotage. It did allow $13,000 paid directly to an IT consultant whose work related to investigating a former colleague. The decision, T.C. Memo. 2023-42, was affirmed by the Tenth Circuit in 2024. Opinion pages 2–4.
The rule for different tax years
Collateral estoppel applies when the issue is identical to one decided before, was actually litigated, was essential to a final judgment, and the party had a full and fair opportunity to litigate it. The court said the parties “mainly agree” that the first element is dispositive. Opinion page 5.
For different tax years, the Supreme Court’s decision in Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 (1948), asks whether the years are “separable.” The court described two ways they can be: The years are governed by different legal rules, or there is a material difference in their controlling facts. A different year number alone is not enough. Opinion pages 5–6.
Why 2011 and 2012 could not be separated from 2013 and 2014
The Andersons identified no change in the law between the years. On the facts, the court gave four reasons the years matched. Opinion pages 6–8.
- The charged conduct came first. The Tax Court’s finding that the conduct was unrelated to his business concerns historical facts that predate every year at issue, so it cannot differ from one year to the next.
- The lawyer’s work did not change. The Andersons did not argue that the habeas lawyer’s time entries or the nature of his work changed between 2011–2012 and 2013–2014.
- The timing cut against them. They had told the Tax Court the evidence of intellectual-property theft was discovered in 2013 and 2014. Money spent in 2011 and 2012 could not have gone to investigating evidence not yet found.
- The consultant argument was forfeited. They mentioned the IT consultant in passing but identified no payments to him in 2011 or 2012.
New evidence of innocence did not help either. Preventing parties from reopening decisions with new evidence is one purpose of collateral estoppel. And, the court reasoned, a claim’s “origin and character” “presumably does not depend on whether the claim is true or false — only on its nature.” As it put it, “The purpose of a given legal expense is settled at the time it is incurred and cannot logically be changed after the fact.” Because the Andersons’ arguments on the other three elements all assumed the issues were not identical, they failed with the first. Opinion pages 7–8.
A final conviction could not be reopened in a tax case
The Andersons also argued that the innocence evidence was a special circumstance justifying an exception to collateral estoppel. The court rejected the argument because it could not use the evidence for that purpose: The Court of Federal Claims has no jurisdiction over criminal matters, cannot review criminal convictions, and cannot hear appeals from state or federal courts. It therefore had to treat the conviction as valid. Opinion pages 8–9.
The court explained where the line falls: “This Court may look to the nature of charged conduct and decide whether it is connected to the taxpayer’s business. What it may not do is decide or assume, after conviction, that the charged conduct did not take place.” It contrasted cases denying deductions for defending off-duty or at-home conduct with Commissioner v. Tellier, which allowed defense costs for charges arising directly from a securities business. In a footnote, the court expressly did not reach whether the fees could be deducted if Dr. Anderson were ever exonerated, the outcome sought by the state petition that the November 9 opinion described as pending. Opinion pages 9–10.
Result and what the case means
The government’s motion for summary judgment was granted and the case dismissed (opinion page 10). Appeals from final decisions of the Court of Federal Claims go to the Federal Circuit (28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3)).
Our reading: A taxpayer who loses a deduction issue in Tax Court can be bound in other years when the same expense and the same law are involved, and switching to a refund suit in another court does not change that. Escaping it requires showing that the law changed or that the facts controlling the deduction differ in the other years, for example a different expense with a different purpose, proved with records such as invoices and time entries. A favorable part of the earlier ruling, like the $13,000 consultant allowance here, helps in other years only if the taxpayer identifies matching payments and argues the point.
Facing a deduction the IRS already defeated in another year?
Mishra X Trial Lawyers can review the earlier Tax Court decision, the refund claims and the records behind each year’s expense to see whether the years truly differ or whether a different forum will change nothing. Bring the prior decision, the notices and refund denials, and the invoices, engagement letters and time entries for each year. Call (949) 343-9735 or email office@mishrax.com.