Vargas Rincon: Investigation Evidence Supported the Agency’s Finding on Government Control

You may have asked the police for help and still felt unsafe enough to leave your country. In an asylum claim involving threats from a private group, the record must explain both the harm and the government’s response. Vargas Rincon v. Blanche, No. 25-3332 (9th Cir. Sept. 18, 2026), shows why the timing of reports, investigative follow-up and country evidence can become decisive on appeal. The Ninth Circuit denied a Colombian family’s petition after concluding that the evidence supported the agency’s rejection of their claims.

How the court reviewed the agency’s decision

The Board of Immigration Appeals had conducted its own review of the evidence and law. The Ninth Circuit therefore reviewed the Board’s decision and any portions of the immigration judge’s decision it expressly adopted. The court examined legal conclusions independently, while giving factual findings the deference required by substantial-evidence review.

For the family’s factual challenge to succeed, the record had to compel a conclusion contrary to the agency’s. Evidence capable of supporting a different inference was not enough. Vargas Rincon states that standard, citing Bringas-Rodriguez v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 1051, 1059 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc). This explains why a federal appeal depends on the evidence already developed before the agency and the precise alleged error.

The government’s willingness and ability were alternative grounds

For harm inflicted by a private actor, an asylum applicant must show that the government was unwilling or unable to control the persecutor. The court applied Madrigal v. Holder, 716 F.3d 499, 503, 506 (9th Cir. 2013). The applicant need not establish both unwillingness and inability.

The family argued that the Board effectively required both. In Vargas Rincon, the court found that the Board had repeatedly stated the alternatives correctly and examined evidence concerning each. In the factual challenge, the family accepted the Colombian government’s willingness to act but disputed its ability to control the Gulf Clan. Keeping the legal-standard argument separate from the evidence of actual capacity is essential to understanding the ruling.

Why the reporting and investigation chronology mattered

The family reported death threats to the police and left Colombia within three weeks. They reported an assassination attempt to a prosecutor and left within a day. A prosecutor contacted them a few weeks later as part of the investigation. The agency also considered country evidence describing government efforts against armed cartels, including successful prosecutions of leaders and members. Those are the particular facts identified in Vargas Rincon and the following discussion.

The court relied on Doe v. Holder, 736 F.3d 871, 878 (9th Cir. 2013), for the point that an unsolved crime or failure to arrest a perpetrator does not, by itself, establish inability to control the persecutor. It also cited Antonio v. Garland, 58 F.4th 1067, 1077 (9th Cir. 2023), concerning promised future action followed by no action. The distinction directs attention to what officials actually did after a report.

Considering the response chronology and country materials together, the panel concluded that the record did not compel a finding that Colombia was unable or unwilling to control the Gulf Clan. Vargas Rincon explains the result with reference to Hussain v. Rosen, 985 F.3d 634, 648 (9th Cir. 2021). The court examined the government’s efforts and country evidence, explaining that failure to prevent every risk of harm does not necessarily establish inability to control a private actor. That reasoning addressed the family’s actual inability argument: They did not dispute the government’s willingness to act. The ruling concerns whether this evidence required reversal of the agency, rather than a new assessment of every danger facing the family.

The separate torture-protection claim and the result

The court also rejected the Convention Against Torture claim. It assumed the issue had been sufficiently preserved in the opening brief and still found substantial evidence supporting the agency: The family had not established that they were more likely than not to be tortured by, or with the consent or acquiescence of, the Colombian government. That separate analysis cites Sharma v. Garland, 9 F.4th 1052, 1067 (9th Cir. 2021).

The court denied the petition and the opposed motion to stay removal. Read Vargas Rincon for that disposition. Describing CAT as rejected solely for briefing forfeiture would miss the panel’s merits ruling; the court assumed preservation and resolved the claim against the family.

What to preserve when government protection is disputed

A reporting chronology should identify the threat, the report made, the official response and what followed. Keep police and prosecutor records, messages, follow-up calls, investigation updates and evidence of later threats together. A family’s reasons for leaving may be important to explain alongside those dates.

• Connect country evidence to the locality, threatening actor, relevant period and kind of government response at issue.
• Identify whether the argument concerns unwillingness, inability or both alternatives, and explain the evidence for each.
• Distinguish an investigation or follow-up from a promise followed by no action, using the actual records.
• Address CAT separately through the evidence of likely torture and government involvement or acquiescence.

Related reading: The deportation-defense practice page describes representation; the removal-defense FAQ and removal-proceeding guide explain the different stages. For a specific record, bring the agency decisions, hearing materials and evidence already submitted.