Smith v. Burbank Unified School District: Unpaid Leave and the Accommodation Record

Smith v. Burbank Unified School District

Smith v. Burbank Unified School District, No. B347288 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 7, 2026) (certified for publication). California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight. Authored by Justice Wiley; Presiding Justice Stratton and Justice Scherb concurring. Affirming summary judgment entered in Los Angeles County Superior Court No. 23STCV02429, Judge Gail Killefer presiding.

Background

Douglas Smith had taught high school chemistry and physical science at Burbank Unified School District since 1992, with consistently positive evaluations and plans to remain until retirement. Smith, slip op. at 2. His normal workday began around 7:15 a.m. and included five or six 55-minute classes, hands-on laboratory supervision, student tutoring, and daily collegial interaction. Smith, slip op. at 3.

Following California Department of Public Health guidance in August 2021 strongly recommending vaccination for K-12 employees and documenting mounting infection rates, the District's Board of Education adopted Resolution 7. The Board required all staff to be fully vaccinated or receive an authorized exemption, and barred unvaccinated employees from school campuses after October 25, 2021. Smith, slip op. at 4. The Board acted after the prior hybrid reopening had brought repeated closures, employee illness, and deaths among staff members’ spouses. Smith, slip op. at 4.

Smith, a devout Christian whose faith compelled him to decline vaccination, promptly sought a religious exemption. The District received approximately 100 exemption requests on religious, medical, and other grounds and granted every one of them, including Smith's. Smith, slip op. at 4–5.

The District's Accommodation Process

The District assessed potential accommodations across all exempted employees by examining whether their duties required in-person contact with students, faculty, or the public; the logistics of covering absences; and the risk of disrupting mandatory student supervision. Smith, slip op. at 5. Five exempted employees whose responsibilities did not require in-person contact—all in isolated office roles, none of them teachers—received modified on-site arrangements: twice-weekly testing, physical barriers, masking, and six-foot distancing. Smith, slip op. at 5. All exempted teachers, including Smith, were offered only unpaid leave because the District determined that in-person classroom instruction with an unvaccinated employee could not be mitigated to an acceptable safety level and would jeopardize its ability to meet state supervision mandates. Smith, slip op. at 5–6.

In October 2021, the District wrote to Smith that it could not identify a reasonable accommodation other than unpaid leave without undue hardship, citing the risk of infection and illness for students and staff—particularly those who were unvaccinated or immunocompromised—and the danger of disrupting in-person instruction entirely. Smith, slip op. at 6. Smith was offered unpaid leave or resignation. Smith, slip op. at 6.

Smith appealed internally to Superintendent Matt Hill, who denied the appeal. Smith, slip op. at 8. After Smith submitted a formal written complaint, District investigators rejected his request for PCR testing as an alternative, finding that twice-weekly testing would not adequately address the elevated risk created by an unvaccinated employee working in indoor classrooms with rotating student groups. Smith, slip op. at 8. The District also confirmed no remote teaching vacancies existed because in-person instruction and student interaction were essential teacher duties. Smith, slip op. at 8–9.

Smith was placed on leave in October 2021. He exhausted paid time off and transitioned to unpaid status on March 7, 2022. Smith, slip op. at 7. He extended his leave twice and, in January 2023, accepted a chemistry teaching position at Magnolia Public Schools, which had no vaccine mandate. Smith, slip op. at 9. When the District's mandate expired in early 2024 and Smith was invited to return, he declined and resigned effective June 2024. Smith, slip op. at 9.

Claims and Summary Judgment

Smith's operative complaint alleged three causes of action under the Fair Employment and Housing Act, Government Code section 12900 et seq.: unlawful religious discrimination under section 12940, subdivision (l)(1); failure to prevent discrimination; and retaliation for seeking accommodation. Smith, slip op. at 9. The District moved for summary judgment with supporting declarations from administrative officials. Assistant Superintendent of Education Services Dr. John Paramo declared that the District's undue-hardship determination focused on logistical classroom-coverage difficulties, obligations to meet state student-supervision mandates, and the need to avoid educational disruption while maintaining the safest possible learning environment. Smith, slip op. at 10.

The trial court granted summary judgment. It found Smith established a prima facie discrimination case but that the District satisfied its burden of showing unpaid leave was the only reasonable accommodation that did not impose an undue hardship. Smith, slip op. at 10–11. The court rejected Smith's argument that untested barrier-and-testing alternatives were viable, finding his proposed alternatives were unsupported by evidence establishing their existence and feasibility and failed to show those measures would be as effective as vaccination in an indoor classroom environment. Smith, slip op. at 10. Because the discrimination claim failed, the failure-to-prevent and retaliation claims were dismissed as derivative. Smith, slip op. at 10–11.

Court of Appeal Analysis

The appellate court independently reviewed the propriety of summary judgment. Smith, slip op. at 11. Under Government Code section 12940, subdivision (l)(1), an employer must explore reasonable alternatives to accommodate a religious belief but is excused if it demonstrates it cannot do so without undue hardship. Smith, slip op. at 11.

Unpaid leave as a reasonable accommodation. Smith argued that California Code of Regulations, title 2, section 11062, subdivision (a)—which states that an accommodation is not reasonable if it requires segregation of an employee from customers or the general public without the employee's express request—categorically disqualified unpaid leave. Smith, slip op. at 11–12. The court disagreed. Unpaid leave eliminated the conflict between Smith's religious practice and the vaccination requirement, and the District preserved Smith's job classification and his right to return to his former position when the mandate was lifted. Smith, slip op. at 12. The court also noted that FEHA doctrine is informed by federal Title VII decisions, and that federal authority recognizes unpaid leave as a valid accommodation in appropriate circumstances because it removes the conflict by allowing full observance while protecting the employment relationship. Smith, slip op. at 12. The court declined to read the regulation's segregation sentence as an automatic prohibition given the undisputed evidence of public-health risk and the District's operational obligations. Smith, slip op. at 12.

Sufficiency of undue-hardship evidence. Smith contended the trial court accepted only a generalized account of potential hardships without requiring specific proof. Smith, slip op. at 13. The appellate court held that Smith provided no evidence to counter the District's sworn declarations about operational disruptions, classroom-coverage and staffing difficulties, and supervision mandates. Smith, slip op. at 13–14. His assertion that allowing one additional unvaccinated person onto campus created no meaningful hardship was argument, not evidence, and did not create a triable issue of material fact. Smith, slip op. at 13–14.

Neutral application of exemption criteria. The court noted that the District treated all exempted employees identically: every request was granted; only non-teacher office employees with isolated duties received on-site modifications; all in-person teachers received unpaid leave. Smith, slip op. at 14. The court distinguished the isolated office roles from teaching positions and evaluated the district’s evidence about the actual work. Smith, slip op. at 14.

The court affirmed summary judgment and awarded costs to the District. Smith, slip op. at 14. The full certified opinion is available through the California Courts official opinion archive.

Key Evidentiary Takeaways

This decision is fact-bound to the fall 2021 pandemic school reopening period and to the specific operational demands of in-person public-school instruction. It does not establish a universal rule that unpaid leave is always an adequate accommodation in every FEHA context. Practitioners and employees analyzing accommodation disputes should focus on:

• Contemporaneous duty documentation: A record of actual daily contact hours, supervision requirements, and workspace configurations at the time of the accommodation request controls whether alternatives were feasible.
• Concrete undue-hardship evidence: A generalized concern does not establish the operational facts. In this case, sworn declarations supplied concrete evidence of the classroom and staffing consequences, and Smith did not offer evidence creating a material factual dispute.
• Neutral exemption application: Applying identical, job-specific criteria across all exemption bases—religious, medical, and other—demonstrates the absence of discriminatory motive.
• Preserved return rights: Maintaining job classification and return eligibility during leave supports the legal adequacy of leave as an accommodation rather than a constructive termination.
• Claims in this case: Where the primary discrimination claim fails on the merits, derivative failure-to-prevent and retaliation claims fail with it absent independent supporting evidence.

For practical guidance on documenting accommodation requests and building an interactive-process record, see Religious Accommodation at Work: Compare Actual Duties and Available Alternatives.