PPL Corp. v. Commissioner: The Outlier-Taxpayer Question Left Open

Two tax instruments layered over the same profit ledger

A foreign levy can work like an income tax for most of the people who pay it and quite differently for a few. If you are one of the few, or the IRS points to them, the question is whether those outliers change the character of the whole tax. In PPL Corp. v. Commissioner, 569 U.S. 329 (2013), the Supreme Court held the 1997 U.K. windfall tax creditable by analyzing the 27 companies that shared a 1,461-day initial period. It declined to decide whether two companies with much shorter periods changed the tax’s predominant character, because the government had not preserved that argument. Justice Sotomayor joined the Court’s opinion but wrote separately to explain why she found the outlier argument persuasive, and she reserved it “for another day and another context.”

Five companies did not fit the common period

The windfall tax took a company’s profits over its “initial period” of rate regulation, divided them by the number of days in that period, annualized the result and multiplied it by a fixed price-to-earnings figure of 9. It then subtracted the company’s flotation value, its market value when privatized, and taxed the difference at 23%. Because the number of days (D) sits inside the formula, period length changes the result.

Twenty-seven of the 32 companies shared a 1,461-day period. Of the other five, three had periods close to four years (1,463, 1,456 and 1,380 days). Railtrack, privatized shortly before the 1997 election, had only 316 days. The fifth company owed nothing because it earned no windfall profits; the concurrence identifies it as British Energy, with a 260-day period. South Western Electricity, in which PPL held a 25% interest, was not among the five.

What the majority decided, and what it set aside

The majority read the Treasury regulation to make a tax’s normal operation controlling. A foreign tax that operates as an income tax “in most instances is creditable,” the Court wrote, “even if it may affect a handful of taxpayers differently.” Creditability is all or nothing: In the regulation’s words, a tax “either is or is not an income tax, in its entirety, for all persons subject to the tax.” Holding D at 1,461 days, the Court rearranged the formula into an effective 51.71% tax on profits above a threshold, a classic excess-profits tax, and reversed the Third Circuit.

In footnote 6, the Court addressed an amicus brief arguing that the two short-period companies, Railtrack and British Energy, meant the tax’s predominant character was not that of an income tax. The Court described that as a claim “that two outliers changed the predominant character” of the tax and noted that the Tax Court had rejected it. The Commissioner admitted at oral argument that he had not preserved the argument, so the Court expressed “no view on its merits.”

Justice Sotomayor’s numbers for the outliers

Justice Sotomayor wrote that the majority’s result depended on two moves: limiting the analysis to the 1,461-day companies and treating D as fixed. Put each company’s actual period into the formula and the picture changes. For the common-period group, the rearranged tax is 51.71% of profits above 44.47% of flotation value. For Railtrack, the same algebra yields 239.10% of profits above 9.62% of flotation value. British Energy’s figures would have been 290.60% and 7.91%. The three near-four-year companies ranged from 51.64% to 54.75%.

That variation was her point. An ordinary income tax applies a fixed rate to a base that varies; an excess-profits tax adds a threshold. Here both the rate and the threshold moved with each company’s period length. Seen that way, the levy was “really a tax on average profits”: A company earning $100 million over 1,461 days would pay about the same tax as one earning $25 million over 365 days. Average daily profits multiplied by a price-to-earnings ratio, she wrote, is a way of approximating value, not income. The short-period companies were therefore “not random outliers” but “critical pieces of data” about how the tax actually worked.

Which taxpayers count: two readings of the regulation

Whether those companies matter depends on how the regulation’s “all persons” language is read. On one reading, which the concurrence’s argument requires, a tax must have the predominant character of an income tax for every taxpayer subject to it. On another, drawn from a Tax Court decision the concurrence cited, a tax need only be an income tax for “a substantial number of taxpayers.” Under that reading, she acknowledged, the average-profits argument “cannot get off the ground,” and outliers like Railtrack are treated as flukes. In our reading, the majority’s own statement of the rule (creditable if the tax works as an income tax in most instances, even if a handful of taxpayers are affected differently) sits closer to this second reading. Footnote 6 set aside only the narrower question whether Railtrack and British Energy changed this tax’s character.

The government had rejected the relevance of outliers at oral argument and had not raised them in the Third Circuit, so only amici had pressed the point. The Court can consider an interpretation offered by amici, Justice Sotomayor wrote, but should be “reluctant to do so” when the issue is one of first impression and the government has taken what appears to be a contrary position. So, while finding the argument persuasive, she did not base her analysis on it and joined the Court’s opinion.

An estimate that misses versus a formula that reveals

The concurrence drew a line between two kinds of outliers. In Texasgulf, Inc. v. Commissioner, 172 F.3d 209 (2d Cir. 1999), a Canadian mining tax gave every company a fixed “processing allowance” instead of deducting actual expenses. Some companies’ real costs exceeded the allowance, but the tax was still trying to reach net income, and the Second Circuit held it creditable. A company that happens to have costs above an estimate, she wrote in footnote 1, “is not an instructive outlier.” The windfall-tax outliers were different in her view: They showed what the formula itself measured.

In our reading, an argument about uneven treatment should show which input causes it. If the cause is an imperfect estimate of costs, the Texasgulf reasoning points toward creditability. If changing an input such as the period length changes both the effective rate and the threshold, the argument is closer to the one the concurrence made, which the Court left undecided. Our analysis of how the majority rearranged the windfall-tax formula walks through the common-period algebra.

What to gather if a levy hits taxpayers unevenly

The rules for the year of your claim

PPL applied Treasury Regulation § 1.901-2 as it governed a 1997 credit claim. Final foreign tax credit regulations published January 4, 2022, changed the creditability rules under sections 901 and 903, including an attribution requirement. A July 2023 notice (Notice 2023-55) allowed taxpayers to fall back on prior rules for some of those changes, and a December 2023 notice (Notice 2023-80) kept that relief in place until further notice. The IRS summarizes these rules for individuals in Publication 514; corporate claims rest on the same regulations and notices. Which version of the regulation governs your tax year decides how far PPL’s analysis, and its open question, reaches. Our foreign-tax-credit review guide covers the return and payment records, and our tax dispute practice can review the foreign law, your assessment and the IRS letters with you.

Does an IRS challenge turn on how a foreign tax treats other payers?

We can work through the levy’s formula, test how it treats the different taxpayers it reaches, determine which year’s regulations apply and prepare the response to the IRS. Bring the foreign law and any translation, the assessment, proof that you paid, your Form 1116 or 1118 and the IRS letters. Call (949) 343-9735 or email office@mishrax.com.