Mejia-Morales v. Bondi: Gang Violence, Family Nexus, and the Asylum Record

The Ninth Circuit denied a Salvadoran mother and daughter’s petition after separating past persecution, future risk, protected-ground motive, withholding, and CAT. The decision shows why credible testimony and a proposed family group do not resolve every element of protection.

Decision, posture, and precedential status

Mejia-Morales v. Bondi, No. 21-70778 (9th Cir. Dec. 30, 2025), is a nonpublished memorandum, not binding precedent except as Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 provides. Karla Iliana Mejia-Morales and her minor daughter, both natives and citizens of El Salvador, sought review of the BIA’s affirmance of an immigration judge’s denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection. Id., slip op. at 1–2.

The BIA affirmed without an opinion under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4). The court therefore reviewed the IJ’s reasoning as the agency decision. It applied substantial-evidence review: Reversal required evidence compelling a contrary conclusion, not merely evidence that could support a different result. That procedural lens limits how broadly the outcome should be read. Id., slip op. at 2.

Credibility did not establish past persecution

The applicant credibly testified that gang members murdered two former romantic partners. She had not been directly harmed or threatened, though she believed gang members followed her. The panel upheld the determination that her experiences did not rise to the extreme level of persecution. It did not reject her testimony as fabricated. Id., slip op. at 2.

This distinction is central. Credibility concerns whether an account is believed; legal sufficiency concerns what the account establishes. The memorandum does not announce that the murder of a loved one can never constitute or contribute to persecution. It holds that this record did not compel reversal of this agency finding.

The future-risk finding required more than genuine fear

Without a finding of past persecution, the applicant did not receive a presumption of future persecution. The court acknowledged a subjectively genuine fear but upheld the agency’s conclusion that an objectively reasonable fear of qualifying harm had not been established. Id., slip op. at 2–3.

The practical distinction is between the seriousness of what happened to others and evidence that this applicant is likely to be targeted. The decision does not make country conditions irrelevant. It demonstrates that the individual account, current threats, and the relationship between the applicant and alleged persecutors still require examination.

The court assumed the groups and decided nexus separately

The applicant proposed two groups: Salvadoran family members targeted by gangs in connection with reporting a crime, and family. The IJ assumed both were cognizable, and the government did not contest that assumption in its briefing. The panel therefore did not decide whether those formulations satisfy every requirement for a particular social group. Id., slip op. at 3 n.1.

Instead, the court upheld the finding that membership was not one central reason for the feared or experienced harm. The IJ attributed the partners’ murders to extortion attempts. The panel emphasized the persecutor’s motive rather than the victim’s perspective and noted that family members remaining in El Salvador, including the applicant’s youngest daughter, had not been harmed. Id., slip op. at 3.

The decision does not hold that extortion and a protected motive are mutually exclusive. Unharmed relatives are an evidentiary factor, not an automatic bar. Those were evidentiary considerations supporting the agency’s finding in this record. A different record would require its own evaluation of motive and relative risk.

Withholding and CAT received separate analyses

For withholding, the panel identified both a failure to establish that persecution was more likely than not and a failure to establish that group membership was a reason for future persecution. It did not import asylum’s one-central-reason nexus threshold into withholding. Id., slip op. at 4.

CAT likewise required its own analysis. The panel found no compelled conclusion that the applicant would likely suffer torture or that such torture would occur with official consent or acquiescence under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1). CAT does not require persecution on account of a protected ground. Its failure here should not be converted into a general rule that denial of asylum always disposes of CAT. Id.

Outcome and record-building implications

The petition was denied. The stay motion was denied as moot, and the temporary stay was to dissolve when the mandate issued. The disposition did not grant reopening or remand for a new hearing. Id., slip op. at 4 & n.2.

For another case, the useful questions are concrete: What evidence connects the applicant to the threat? What proves motive? What explains current risk despite unharmed relatives? What supports torture and official acquiescence independently? Our asylum evidence guide addresses those questions without treating this memorandum as a new controlling rule. Consult our immigration practice with the actual agency record and decision notices.