Uber Technologies, Inc. v. City of Seattle: Ninth Circuit Upholds Seattle App-Worker Deactivation Disclosure Rules

On October 29, 2026, in Uber Technologies, Inc. v. City of Seattle, Nos. 25-228 & 25-231 (9th Cir. Oct. 29, 2026), the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction sought by Uber Technologies, Inc. and Maplebear Inc. (Instacart) to block Seattle’s App-Based Worker Deactivation Rights Ordinance. The appellate court concurrently issued an order withdrawing its previous March 4, 2026 opinion and dissent and denying a petition for rehearing en banc as moot, filing a superseding amended opinion that resolved the constitutional challenge.

The Challenged Ordinance and Delivery App Scope

Enacted as Seattle Ordinance 126878 and codified in Seattle Municipal Code Chapter 8.40, the law regulates app-based network companies offering temporary delivery or personal shopping services, specifically excluding rideshare drivers (Uber Technologies, slip op. at 8). Section 8.40.050.A requires network platforms to inform app-based workers in writing of their deactivation policies in English and any language the company knows or has reason to know is the worker’s primary language and mandates that deactivation policies be reasonably related to safe and efficient operations (Uber Technologies, slip op. at 23–24). The ordinance specifies eight examples of impermissible deactivation rules, including account terminations based solely on aggregate customer ratings or background check results except for egregious misconduct or where other applicable law requires it (Uber Technologies, slip op. at 24–25).

Commercial Speech Analysis and First Amendment Scrutiny

Uber and Instacart argued that requiring platforms to draft, disclose, and restrict deactivation rules unconstitutionally compelled pure speech on controversial issues (Uber Technologies, slip op. at 12). The Ninth Circuit panel majority, in an opinion by Circuit Judge Clifton joined by Circuit Judge Graber, assumed without deciding that the ordinance regulates speech but categorized it as commercial speech concerning the terms of engagement for temporary work (Uber Technologies, slip op. at 12–13). The majority distinguished social-media public reporting statutes evaluated in NetChoice, LLC v. Bonta and X Corp. v. Bonta, explaining that Seattle’s ordinance governs internal workplace disclosures rooted in longstanding historical warrant (Uber Technologies, slip op. at 14).

Applying the commercial disclosure standard from Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel to the written notice provision in subsection 8.40.050.A.1, the court held that compelling platforms to inform workers of deactivation standards serves Seattle’s substantial interest in worker health and safety, concerns purely factual information, and imposes no undue burden (Uber Technologies, slip op. at 16). The majority reasoned that the issued policy would be literally true as a description of the platform’s own rules. The panel also emphasized that platforms remain free to express their disagreement with ordinance requirements alongside their written policy disclosures (Uber Technologies, slip op. at 17–18). Under the threshold test of Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, the court further concluded that restricting deactivation criteria to reasonable operational standards governs speech related to unlawful account terminations (Uber Technologies, slip op. at 18–19).

Why the majority rejected vagueness—and where the dissent disagreed

The panel rejected the plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment vagueness challenge, holding that the statutory term “reasonable” provides fair notice when read in context with statutory definitions and clear carveouts for egregious misconduct and driving records (Uber Technologies, slip op. at 19–21). Circuit Judge Bennett agreed on vagueness but dissented on the First Amendment analysis. He agreed that the speech is commercial and that Zauderer supplies the framework, but would have the district court apply it first. He also found serious questions about whether the required policy judgments are purely factual and uncontroversial. He also challenged the majority’s threshold reasoning on unlawful activity: Defining an unwarranted deactivation through the ordinance’s own policy requirements, he reasoned, cannot itself avoid First Amendment scrutiny. He would remand because the district court had not performed that scrutiny, allowing it to reconsider the preliminary-injunction factors. Uber Technologies, dissent at 27–36.

Disposition and Practical Reach

Because the network companies failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits under Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order denying preliminary injunctive relief (Uber Technologies, slip op. at 22). A stipulated stay pending appeal previously entered by the district court remained in place through the appellate decision (Uber Technologies, slip op. at 11). The published majority opinion supplies the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning on the Seattle provisions challenged in this preliminary-injunction appeal. Its commercial-speech analysis distinguishes worker-facing disclosures from compelled reports about public controversies. The ordinance’s substantive protections and scope remain Seattle law; a California worker needs the law and orders applicable to the worker’s own situation.

Bennett also emphasized the enforcement timeline: The policy requirement could be enforced from January 1, 2025, while enforcement of the unwarranted-deactivation prohibition was delayed until June 1, 2027. That separation supported his conclusion that the speech requirement needed its own constitutional analysis. Uber Technologies, dissent, page 29.