Torres-Contreras: Military Kinship and Family Targeting Required Different Social-Group Proof

Evidence that gangs targeted a particular family did not compel recognition of the broader social group actually proposed. In Torres-Contreras v. Bondi, No. 23-3986 (9th Cir. Jan. 15, 2026), the Ninth Circuit denied a Salvadoran mother and daughter’s petition after examining social distinction and separate preservation defects.

This is an unpublished memorandum, nonprecedential except as Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 permits. The daughter was a derivative beneficiary of the mother’s application.

The exact proposed group framed the evidence question

The proposed group was “adult female Salvadorans with kinship ties to Salvadoran military service members.” The agency found that group insufficiently socially distinct. The court reviewed whether the evidence compelled a contrary conclusion, not merely whether another view was possible.

The panel explained that social distinction concerns perception by the society as a whole, residents of a region or members of a different social group. The persecutor’s own perspective is not the same inquiry. The petitioners pointed to their belief that gangs targeted their family because of military relationships, but identified no evidence showing societal perception of the broader proposed class. Torres-Contreras, memorandum at 2–3.

Parada concerned an identified family, not the same broad formulation

The panel distinguished Parada v. Sessions, 902 F.3d 901, 910 (9th Cir. 2018). There, guerrillas had singled out the petitioner’s family by name in connection with government and military service. That family group differed from a general class defined by military kinship.

The distinction made the proposed group’s wording consequential. A citation involving family-based persecution did not supply missing society-specific evidence for this formulation. Substantial evidence supported the agency’s social-distinction finding, resolving the asylum and withholding claims on that ground. Torres-Contreras at 3–4.

Other theories failed at different procedural stages

The CAT claim and an alternative social group had not been raised before the BIA. The panel applied 8 U.S.C. section 1252(d)(1)’s exhaustion requirement, quoting Shen v. Garland, 109 F.4th 1144, 1157 (9th Cir. 2024): The requirement is a mandatory claim-processing rule, not a jurisdictional limit.

The political-opinion theory presented another sequence. It had been raised before the BIA, which declined to consider it because it was new on that appeal. The court noted the BIA’s authority to apply procedural default under Honcharov v. Barr, 924 F.3d 1293 (9th Cir. 2019). The petitioners then failed to develop a challenge to that ruling in their federal opening brief, forfeiting that challenge. Torres-Contreras at 4–5.

The petition was denied, with the temporary stay tied to mandate

The court denied the petition and kept the temporary stay in place until mandate, otherwise denying the stay motion. The memorandum does not establish a later mandate date or present custody status.

The case’s useful distinctions are specific: The proposed group versus an identified family, societal recognition versus persecutor motive, and agency exhaustion versus federal briefing forfeiture. Our social-distinction evidence guide addresses the practical source-review task without treating the federal appeal as a new evidentiary hearing.