Toboso-Alfonso: The Cuban Case That Opened Asylum Law to Gay Applicants

You are gay, and you cannot go home. Maybe your country punishes it. Maybe the police shrug when others do. A lawyer for the government may tell the judge that you can stay safe if you keep quiet, or that what you fear is only the enforcement of an ordinary law. Does American immigration law accept that?
It does not, and the starting point is a decision about a Cuban man who came on the Mariel boatlift. In 1990 the Board of Immigration Appeals upheld a ruling that gay people in Cuba were a “particular social group” and that this man could not be sent back. Four years later Attorney General Janet Reno made that decision binding in immigration cases. It has been the foundation of sexual-orientation claims ever since.
The case is Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I&N Dec. 819, Interim Decision 3222 (BIA Mar. 12, 1990). Its core still holds. Its reasoning has changed in one important way, and belonging to the group has never been enough by itself.
Thirteen years on a government list
Fidel Armando Toboso-Alfonso testified that a Cuban government office registered and kept files on all homosexuals. His file was opened in 1967. For 13 years, every two or three months, he received a notice with his name, the word “homosexual,” and a date to appear. Each hearing was a physical examination followed by questions about his sex life and partners. On many occasions, he said, he was held at the police station for three or four days without charge.
He testified that being homosexual was itself a crime in Cuba and that, once, after he missed work, he was sent to a forced labor camp for 60 days because he was gay.
Then came 1980. At the time of the Mariel boatlift, he testified, the Union of Communist Youth held a demonstration against gay people at his factory. The same day a paper on his door told him to report to “the public order.” The chief of police gave him a choice: four years in the penitentiary for being a homosexual, or leave for the United States. He had a week to decide. The day he left, neighbors threw eggs and tomatoes at him.
He arrived in June 1980 on parole. In 1985 the parole ended and he was placed in exclusion proceedings in Houston, where he conceded he could be excluded. His record included convictions for possessing cocaine and for burglary.
The immigration judge found his testimony credible and thought that, if anything, he had been “restrained” in describing his life in Cuba. The judge held he was eligible for both asylum and withholding as a member of a particular social group. He denied asylum in his discretion because of the criminal record, and granted withholding of deportation. The Immigration and Naturalization Service appealed. Toboso-Alfonso did not, so only withholding was before the Board.
The government called it deviant behavior
The government’s position is worth reading for how it was put. It argued that “socially deviated behavior, i.e. homosexual activity is not a basis for finding a social group within the contemplation of the Act.” Recognizing such a group, it said, “would be tantamount to awarding discretionary relief to those involved in behavior that is not only socially deviant in nature, but in violation of the laws or regulations of the country as well.”
The argument had two parts. The first said this is behavior, and behavior is not a group. The second said a finding for him would mean relief for everyone in the group.
Status, not conduct
The Board answered the first part with the facts. The evidence did “not reflect that it was specific activity that resulted in the governmental actions against him in Cuba, it was his having the status of being a homosexual.” Cuba had a list. The notices came whether or not he had done anything.
It answered the second part with the elements of the claim. Finding that a group exists does not award anything. People in the group must still prove that its members are persecuted or that their life or freedom would be threatened because of that status.
The Board “principally” relied on something narrower. The government had left the immigration judge’s immutability finding unchallenged and nothing suggested that being registered by the Cuban government as a homosexual was “subject to change.” So the Board’s conclusion was that the government’s challenge was inadequately supported. Later courts and the Board would supply that reasoning.
Four years in prison, or leave
Withholding then required a “clear probability,” meaning it is more likely than not that the person’s life or freedom would be threatened. The Board focused on the final threat. His testimony that he had been told to leave or face four years, simply because he was gay, was uncontested. There was no evidence that the “choice” followed any specific act, or that the government did not mean it.
The record, the Board said, indicated the action came from the government’s desire “that all homosexuals be forced to leave their homeland.” And it drew the boundary this way: “This is not simply a case involving the enforcement of laws against particular homosexual acts, nor is this simply a case of assertion of ‘gay rights.’”
Why his criminal record did not end the case
A person convicted of a “particularly serious crime” cannot receive withholding. The government argued that his cocaine conviction barred him. The Board held that neither offense qualified. The drug conviction was for simple possession, and the government agreed that the burglary was not particularly serious. Because withholding was mandatory for someone who qualified, the grant stood.
Two members saw health exams and a one-time threat
Board Member Vacca, joined by Board Member Morris, would have sent him back. The dissent did not argue about the social group. It said he had not shown a clear probability of harm. He himself had called the examinations “primarily” health examinations, and he had said he was never actually incarcerated because of his homosexuality. It also noted that his account of the labor camp was contradictory. The dissent read the 1980 threat as a way to push him out during the boatlift, and pointed to Cuba’s assurances of “no reprisal” for those returned.
It also cited Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), to say that criminal sodomy laws did not violate the fundamental rights of gay people, and to treat what happened to him as related to criminal investigations and health control. That leg of the dissent has been gone since the Supreme Court overruled Bowers in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
He won withholding, not asylum
It is easy to remember this as an asylum case. It was a withholding case. That difference still matters. As the Board explained, withholding is mandatory once the applicant qualifies, but it only bars return to that country, and the person can be sent elsewhere under certain circumstances. Asylum is discretionary and brings broader protection. A criminal record may cost a person asylum while leaving withholding available, as it did here.
The Attorney General’s order designating the decision as precedent came on June 19, 1994, directing that it apply “in all proceedings involving the same issue or issues.”
The line between status and conduct did not last
In our view, the opinion’s emphasis on status helped make the result possible in 1990. It also left a dangerous opening: Could the government say that a person is safe if he simply stops?
The Ninth Circuit closed that opening for California cases. In Karouni v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1163, 1171–73 (9th Cir. 2005), a gay man from Lebanon faced exactly that argument. The government said Lebanon arrests people for acts, not for being gay. The court called this a “Hobson’s choice” between persecution and “a life of celibacy,” and held: “[W]e see no appreciable difference between an individual, such as Karouni, being persecuted for being a homosexual and being persecuted for engaging in homosexual acts.” Lawrence helped drive that result. Karouni built on Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1093–95 (9th Cir. 2000), which relied on Toboso-Alfonso in recognizing gay men with female sexual identities in Mexico as a protected group.
The Board came to the same place in Matter of C-G-T-, 28 I&N Dec. 740, 745–46 & n.7 (BIA 2023), holding that “adjudicators should not expect a respondent to hide his or her sexual orientation if removed to his or her native country.” Its footnote says openly what happened: Toboso-Alfonso had distinguished status from conduct, partly because conduct was then a crime in the United States, and “United States law has since changed.”
So the argument the government made in 1990, and the one it made in Karouni, are no longer good answers to this kind of claim.
What the claim needs now
In the Ninth Circuit, invoke Karouni; everywhere, build the record. Karouni states, at page 1172, that “all alien homosexuals are members of a ‘particular social group,’” a point the government did not dispute there, and Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F.3d 662, 668 (9th Cir. 2010), cites it for that. As restated in Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 227 (BIA 2014), a social group needs an immutable trait, particularity and social distinction. The Board has said Toboso-Alfonso passes that test, and how it reads the case is instructive. At page 245 it pointed to the government office keeping files, the eggs and tomatoes, and the evidence of examinations, interrogations and beatings, and concluded that Cubans saw gay people as a discrete group. Those facts are a template for what to gather.
Private harm counts, if the government will not or cannot stop it. Many applicants fear family, neighbors or gangs, not officials. Bringas-Rodriguez v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc), held that credible testimony that reporting would be futile and dangerous, along with evidence that other gay men had gone to the police for nothing and country reports, compelled the conclusion that a young gay man suffered past persecution in Mexico that the government was unable or unwilling to control, even though he never reported it. The Board agreed, in C-G-T-, that failure to report is “not necessarily fatal.” But Matter of F-B-A-, 29 I&N Dec. 456 (BIA 2026), clarified that “unique barriers to reporting harm faced by children do not apply to adults,” and called the reasonableness of not seeking help “a significant factor.” Immigration judges must also now apply the Attorney General’s A-B- decisions, which Z-R-C-N-, 29 I&N Dec. 523, 525–26 (BIA 2026), treats as reinstated, using them on a motion to reopen to find no initial showing of asylum eligibility because “[t]his type of private criminal conduct does not constitute harm on account of a protected ground.” In our view, harm aimed at someone because of sexual orientation differs from that dispute, but expect the argument. Bringas-Rodriguez remains en banc law in the Ninth Circuit.
Proof of who you are is not proof of sex. A.M. v. Blanche, No. 25-5415 (9th Cir. Oct. 23, 2026), rejected a judge’s reasoning that an applicant could not be bisexual because he had not had sexual relations. “A person’s sexual orientation is not solely defined by their sexual relations.” Our separate analysis of A.M. covers the court’s second ruling, that a judge must identify needed corroboration while the applicant can still respond.
Timing and crimes still decide cases. Asylum must generally be requested within one year of arrival. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B). In C-G-T- itself, the immigration judge denied asylum on that basis, and the Board’s remand concerned withholding. Withholding has its own bar for a “particularly serious crime,” and an aggravated felony with a total sentence of at least five years is automatically in that category. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B). Toboso-Alfonso’s treatment of simple possession was a ruling on those two convictions. A person with any conviction needs a current analysis of it.
Finally, withholding today still requires the “more likely than not” showing. A claim under the Convention Against Torture is separate. It needs no protected ground, but it carries the same more-likely-than-not burden and asks whether the person would be tortured. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2).
Preparing this claim
- Say what the group is, specifically. Name it in writing before the immigration judge, using your country: gay men in Honduras, lesbian women in Uganda, and so on.
- Show how your society marks the group. Laws, police files, news reports, public hostility, what happened to people you know. M-E-V-G- looked at exactly these things in Toboso-Alfonso.
- Describe what happened in detail. Toboso-Alfonso gave dates, the wording of the notices, the police chief’s words and the eggs and tomatoes.
- Do not agree to hide. If you are asked whether you could live discreetly, the answer under Karouni and C-G-T- is that the law does not require it.
- Explain why you did not go to the police, if you did not, and find proof of what happened to others who did.
- Do not let anyone reduce your identity to your sexual history. Relationships, attraction, and how others have labeled you can all be evidence.
- Get corroboration you can reasonably obtain, and if a judge says something is missing, ask for time to get it or explain why you cannot.
- Check the one-year date and every conviction first. Those two facts often decide which forms of protection are available.
- Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I&N Dec. 819, Interim Decision 3222 (BIA Mar. 12, 1990), designated precedent by Attorney General Order No. 1895-94 (June 19, 1994)
- Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 227 (BIA 2014)
- Matter of C-G-T-, 28 I&N Dec. 740 (BIA 2023)
- Matter of F-B-A-, 29 I&N Dec. 456 (BIA 2026)
- Matter of Z-R-C-N-, 29 I&N Dec. 523 (BIA 2026)
- Karouni v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2005)
- Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2010)
- A.M. v. Blanche, No. 25-5415 (9th Cir. Oct. 23, 2026)
Afraid to return because of who you are?
Bring anything showing what happened to you and to others like you, your date of arrival and any criminal record. We can review how to define your group, what evidence your country’s conditions call for, and whether asylum, withholding or Convention Against Torture protection fits. For more on our work, see our deportation defense practice. Call (949) 343-9735 or email office@mishrax.com.