Santos Serrano: Release After Six Months Without a Bond Hearing

Introduction

The habeas petition asked whether Santos Serrano's ongoing immigration detention — which had lasted more than six months without any bond hearing — violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The court granted the petition and ordered Serrano's immediate release, also enjoining the government from re-detaining him without first providing notice and a pre-deprivation hearing.

Material Facts

The material facts were undisputed or treated as uncontested. ICE detained Serrano in December 2025 and charged him as removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). An immigration judge later denied cancellation of removal. Serrano appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, and that appeal remained pending when the district court ruled. From his arrest through the decision—more than six months—he received no bond hearing or individualized custody determination. The record also reflected long residence, community ties, no criminal convictions, and circumstances relevant to flight risk and danger, but no neutral decisionmaker had evaluated those factors.

Issue

Whether detaining Serrano for more than six months without a bond hearing violated the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause.

Parties' Positions

Serrano argued that detention without a custody hearing violated due process and sought release. The government agreed that a bond hearing could be ordered but opposed release, asserting finality based on the voluntary-departure record despite Serrano's position that his timely BIA appeal remained pending. The district court did not resolve that removal-case dispute; it addressed detention only.

Governing Law

The court applied the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, as interpreted in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), which confirms that due process protections apply to all persons within the United States regardless of immigration status. To determine what process was owed, the court used the three-factor balancing framework from Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976): (1) the private interest affected; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation and the value of additional procedural safeguards; and (3) the government's interest, including administrative burden. The court also relied on Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 2011), for the proposition that where substantial liberty interests are at stake, the government must prove by clear and convincing evidence that a noncitizen is a flight risk or danger to the community.

Reasoning

Working through the Mathews factors, the court found the first strongly favored Serrano. His long residence and community ties reinforced the substantial liberty interest already inherent in freedom from physical confinement. On the second factor, the court found the risk of erroneous deprivation high, particularly because Serrano had no criminal convictions and had never received any hearing at which his risk level was assessed. On the third factor, the court found no meaningful government interest in skipping a pre-detention hearing, noting that such hearings impose minimal administrative burden and that the government never argued that a pre-deprivation process would have created flight or safety risks. Balancing these factors, the court concluded that Serrano was entitled to notice and a hearing before being detained, not merely after the fact. Because that process was never provided, the court found his continued detention unlawful and ordered release rather than simply scheduling a bond hearing, reasoning that keeping him detained while awaiting a hearing would perpetuate the same constitutional violation.

Exact Holding

The court held that Serrano's detention for more than six months without a bond hearing violated the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause under the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test.

Exact Disposition and Conditions

The court granted the habeas petition and ordered Serrano's immediate release. It enjoined the government from re-detaining him without providing notice and a pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral decisionmaker at which the government bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that he is a flight risk or danger to the community. If re-detained within the district following proceedings in this case, Serrano may not be transferred out of the district except to execute a final removal order. As a separate prospective safeguard, the injunction required written notice and a meaningful opportunity to seek fear-based relief before any third-country removal; it did not decide removability or the pending BIA appeal. The government was required to file a notice of compliance within three days of the order. The Second TRO application and request for counsel were denied as moot.

What the Decision Did Not Decide

The court expressly declined to review the immigration judge's removal order, the inadmissibility finding, or any other merits question relating to Serrano's removability. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, those matters belong exclusively to the court of appeals by way of a petition for review, after the BIA rules on the pending appeal. As a slip opinion with only a Westlaw citation and no published reporter citation, this decision does not carry formal precedential weight, though its reasoning is consistent with a line of district court decisions in the Ninth Circuit.