Peros: An Anti-SLAPP Motion Cannot Strike Retaliation Claims Built on Unprotected Acts

Crimson strands diverge from a curved bundle of vivid blue fibers on a warm ivory surface.

When an employer uses California’s anti-SLAPP statute against a retaliation or discrimination lawsuit, it can strike only the claims that arise from protected speech or petitioning activity. Claims that rest entirely on unprotected acts, such as a discipline decision or a termination, stay in the case even if the employer says they could not survive a demurrer; a demurrer is the proper way to test them, and it can allow amendment. The Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, so held in Peros v. The Permanente Medical Group, Inc., No. A174067 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 13, 2026), affirming an order that refused to strike a physician’s entire complaint.

Only part of the opinion is published. Part I of the Discussion, which decides that question, is precedent. Part II, which reviews individual allegations, was excluded from publication.

A physician, a leave and two terminations

The facts come from Peros’s verified complaint and the parties’ declarations. James Peros, a gay physician, worked for and was a shareholder of The Permanente Medical Group (TPMG) for about 15 years. He alleged that TPMG showed bias against gay men and that, in 2018 or 2019, he reported misconduct by a heterosexual physician. He alleged that he was told to drop his inquiries and that he made known his intention to report the misconduct to law enforcement.

In October 2021, TPMG placed him on paid leave, restricting him from patient care while it investigated allegations of illegal drug use. He requested a peer review hearing, and a second one after the physician in charge recommended termination in May 2022. In December 2022, he wrote that he had been constructively discharged; TPMG treated the letter as a resignation and also terminated his employment, on the stated ground that he had violated its sick-leave policy. Peros alleged the termination was retaliatory. When he refused to answer drug-use questions at the 2023 hearing, the panel deemed him to have accepted the restriction and recommendation, and the board affirmed both.

Peros sued for whistleblower retaliation under Labor Code section 1102.5, Unruh Civil Rights Act discrimination, misrepresentation, wrongful termination and related claims.

How the anti-SLAPP motion works

Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 allows early dismissal of meritless claims arising from protected speech and petitioning. At step one, the defendant must identify allegations of protected activity and the claims they support. At step two, the plaintiff must show those claims are legally sufficient and factually substantiated. A claim struck this way is struck without leave to amend.

The analysis runs claim by claim. Under Baral v. Schnitt, 1 Cal.5th 376 (2016), one heading can hold several claims, and the motion “does not reach the claims based on unprotected activity.” Under Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University, 2 Cal.5th 1057 (2017), a claim reaches step two only if protected activity supplies one of its elements. And Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System, 11 Cal.5th 995 (2021), held that hospital peer review can be protected but that disciplinary decisions, such as suspending or terminating privileges, are not.

Applying those cases, the trial court struck most of the protected-activity allegations, which ended the misrepresentation claims. It kept retaliation and discrimination claims based on the October 2021 restriction, the May 2022 recommendation and the December 2022 and May 2023 terminations. TPMG did not meaningfully contest that those acts were unprotected.

The employer’s argument: Strike what remains

TPMG first argued that every count rested on peer review because each incorporated all prior allegations. That drafting convention, the court said, “does not mean that each claim within a count rests on every preceding allegation.”

TPMG’s main argument was that once the protected allegations were gone, what remained was defective. It said the whistleblowing was too distant in time from the adverse acts, that Peros pleaded no specific facts showing a decision maker’s discriminatory intent, and that the Unruh Act does not cover employment. Because a demurrer can allow amendment, TPMG argued, the anti-SLAPP statute required the court to strike the entire complaint.

A demurrer, not a motion to strike

The court disagreed. “A claim that does not rest on protected activity—regardless of whether it is otherwise arguably defective—does not clear the step-one threshold and thus is not within the anti-SLAPP statute’s purview,” it wrote. “The procedure for attacking such a claim is a demurrer.”

It rejected three counterarguments. First, the defendant in Baral conceded that some unprotected claims stated a prima facie case, but the Supreme Court did not rely on that concession. Second, Norman v. Ross, 101 Cal.App.5th 617 (2024), struck an entire complaint, but only after protected activity, the producers’ use of a screenwriter’s ideas, supplied an essential element of every claim, sending every claim to step two, where each failed for lack of a probability of prevailing; here some claims never reached step two. Third, the cases TPMG cited for refusing leave to amend involved claims that all arose from protected activity or, in Simmons v. Allstate Ins. Co., 92 Cal.App.4th 1068 (2001), predated Baral’s claim-by-claim approach.

The court also answered the worry that a “cunning plaintiff” could insulate a complaint by mixing in weak unprotected claims. The statute does not prevent that, the court said, because its “central purpose” is to screen out meritless claims “that arise from protected activity,” not weak claims about unprotected acts. Such a claim can still be challenged by demurrer and, if it cannot be fixed, dismissed without leave to amend.

The published holding resolved these claims at step one because they arose from unprotected conduct. Those timing, intent and Unruh Act challenges belong to ordinary pleading motions; the trial court later ruled on a demurrer, which the appeal did not consider. The court affirmed, awarding Peros his costs on appeal. Justice Goldman wrote the opinion; Acting Presiding Justice Streeter and Judge Gordon, sitting by assignment, concurred.

The unpublished part

Part II upheld the refusal to strike allegations about pre-hearing disciplinary steps and about a panel member removed for lying under oath. Its reasoning rests on published Supreme Court decisions, including Park and Bonni, which remain citable on their own.

What this means for an employee suing

These points are our reading of the published holding. If you are suing over retaliation or discrimination, plead each adverse act—a leave, a termination recommendation, a termination—so that it can stand on its own as the basis of a claim. A claim built on an unprotected act then stays out of step two, where a loss means the claim is struck without leave to amend. A claim built on protected activity still needs evidence at step two, as Peros’s stricken misrepresentation claims show. Surviving the motion does not settle the merits: The employer can still test a weak claim by demurrer.

For the merits framework that governs a section 1102.5 retaliation claim, see our analysis of Lawson v. PPG.

Facing an anti-SLAPP motion in an employment case?

Bring the complaint, the motion and its declarations, and the dates of each leave, discipline decision and termination. We can review which claims rest on unprotected acts and how to respond. Call (949) 343-9735 or email office@mishrax.com.