Ordonez-Cardona v. Blanche: Private Property Disputes and Ethnic Nexus in Asylum Claims

An applicant’s account of why neighbors threatened her can be decisive in an asylum case. In Ordonez-Cardona v. Blanche, the Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review, holding that substantial evidence supported agency findings that confrontations over livestock were personal in nature and lacked a statutory nexus to protected ethnic status.

The court reviewed the immigration judge’s reasons

Berta Alicia Ordonez-Cardona and her minor son, natives and citizens of Guatemala, sought review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) order dismissing their appeal from an immigration judge’s decision. The immigration judge had denied their applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The Board affirmed the immigration judge’s decision without issuing a separate opinion.

Under established Ninth Circuit standard of review, when the Board affirms an immigration judge’s decision without opinion, federal courts review the immigration judge’s order as the final agency decision pursuant to Pagayon v. Holder, 675 F.3d 1182, 1188 (9th Cir. 2011). Ordonez-Cardona argued that the Board’s use of its summary affirmance procedure violated her constitutional due process rights. The panel rejected this claim, noting that controlling circuit precedent in Falcon Carriche v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 845, 851 (9th Cir. 2003) expressly forecloses due process challenges to the agency’s streamlining procedures. Ordonez-Cardona, memorandum, page 2.

Her testimony identified a dispute about animals

Both asylum and withholding of removal require proof that past harm or feared future persecution bears a legally sufficient nexus to a protected statutory ground: Race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. The statutory burdens differ in degree: As highlighted in Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 358 (9th Cir. 2017), asylum requires that a protected ground be “one central reason” for the persecution, whereas withholding of removal requires that a protected ground be “a reason.”

Ordonez-Cardona contended that she suffered past harm and feared future harm on account of her Mayan Mam ethnicity. However, her own testimony before the immigration judge established critical record facts that undermined that claim:

• Shared ethnic identity: Ordonez-Cardona testified that the former neighbors who confronted her—a man and a woman—were themselves Indigenous Mayan Mam individuals.
• Personal subject matter: She testified that the confrontations occurred because her neighbors were upset about animals that she kept on her personal property.

The Ninth Circuit held that these decisive record facts supported the immigration judge’s factual determination. Under the deferential substantial-evidence standard set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B), agency factual findings are conclusive unless a reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to reach the opposite conclusion. Because the testimony supported a dispute about animals rather than ethnic targeting, the court concluded that the evidence did not compel a finding of ethnic persecution.

Failure to Establish Official Connection for CAT Protection

To obtain protection under the Convention Against Torture, an applicant must demonstrate that it is more likely than not that she would be subjected to torture if removed, as required by 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). Additionally, under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1), the alleged torture must be inflicted by, at the instigation of, or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or person acting in an official capacity.

The court upheld the CAT denial because the record did not compel a finding of the required official involvement or acquiescence. Ordonez-Cardona testified that she was not afraid of the Guatemalan police and had no knowledge of any collusion between local officers and her former neighbors. Without evidence linking her private land dispute to government action or official acquiescence, the record did not compel reversal of the agency’s order.

Legal Reach and Practical Limits

This decision is an unpublished memorandum disposition issued under Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3, meaning it does not establish binding circuit precedent. Nevertheless, it illustrates how immigration courts evaluate neighbor disputes and private conflicts. The agency’s reading of this applicant’s testimony survived deferential factual review. For another applicant, identify the actual evidence of motive and explain how it connects the threatened harm to the protected characteristic.

The minor son had derivative asylum status on his mother’s application but separate withholding and CAT applications. The memorandum’s footnote explains that the same reasoning also defeated his claims. The review of the summary affirmance concerns Pagayon; de novo review of the due-process issue is separately supported by Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 791–792 (9th Cir. 2005). Ordonez-Cardona, memorandum, page 2 and n.1.