Laurent Castro: A Continuance Could Not Replace the Required In-Absentia Hearing

In Matter of Laurent Castro, the Board of Immigration Appeals held that an immigration judge should have conducted an in-absentia hearing rather than simply continued proceedings after DHS established proper hearing notice and removability. The Board sustained DHS's interlocutory appeal, vacated the continuance order and remanded. It did not itself enter an order removing the respondent.

The timing has two parts: The Board decided the individual appeal on December 30, 2025. The Attorney General designated that decision as precedent on January 23, 2026, as the published decision's first footnote explains. Its later precedential designation should not be attributed to the earlier decision date.

The missed hearing was followed by two later settings

The respondent did not attend an initial master calendar hearing on October 14, 2025. DHS asked the judge to proceed in absentia, relying on the mailed Notice to Appear and a Form I-213 to establish notice and removability. The judge instead continued the proceeding to November 25. On November 24, another notice reset the master calendar hearing to January 6, 2027. 29 I&N Dec. 419, 419–20.

DHS challenged the original continuance through an interlocutory appeal. The Board acknowledged that it generally does not entertain such appeals, but exercised jurisdiction in this case. The existence of a later hearing date therefore did not end review of what the judge had done at the missed hearing.

The statute required the judge to address notice and removability

The Board applied INA section 240(b)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(A), and 8 C.F.R. § 1003.26(c). When the required written notice has been provided and DHS establishes the statutory grounds for proceeding in absentia, the use of mandatory language requires an in-absentia determination. The decision describes DHS's burden concerning notice and removability as clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence. Id. at 419–20.

Here, the Board relied on a certificate of service showing that a Notice to Appear containing the hearing information had been mailed to the last known address, with no indication of nonreceipt. It also relied on the Form I-213 as evidence of removability. The opinion cited the regular-mail delivery presumption from Matter of M-R-A-; it did not hold that mailing proof defeats every possible nonreceipt claim. Id. at 420–21.

The continuance could not substitute for the required hearing

The Board concluded that an in-absentia hearing should have been held on this record. It noted that the judge had not supplied compelling reasons for resetting the matter after DHS established removability. Its disposition sustained DHS's appeal, vacated the October 14 continuance and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. Id. at 421.

The holding is narrower than a rule that every absence requires removal regardless of notice or proof. Those predicates were central to the Board's decision. Nor is a remand equivalent to a final removal order entered by the Board. The actual record and the order entered on remand remain important.

A new calendar date does not explain the entire procedural history

For a respondent who has missed a hearing and later received another date, the useful question is what orders and appeals exist between those dates. Our related guide to a rescheduled hearing after a missed appearance explains how to assemble that chronology without assuming that a new setting erases the earlier event. If an in-absentia order has actually been entered, the separate reopening analysis addresses a different procedural task. Review our immigration defense services for assistance with the actual record.