Ibarra-Vega: Nearly 13 Years Closed, One U-Visa Receipt, and a Case Back on the Calendar

Sandra Ibarra-Vega’s removal case went quiet in 2013, and the government asked for the quiet. Nearly five years later she filed for a U visa, the status Congress created for victims of certain crimes who help law enforcement. Then, in June 2025, the Department of Homeland Security asked an immigration judge to put her case back on the calendar. She answered with a USCIS receipt. The judge left the case closed.

The Board of Immigration Appeals reversed. A receipt showed only that she had filed, the line for U visas is now measured in decades, and a pause that long is no longer a pause. The Board then announced a rule that reaches well past U visas: Absent unique circumstances, closure longer than six months would be presumptively unreasonable.

The decision is Matter of Sandra Ibarra-Vega, 29 I&N Dec. 476, Interim Decision #4167 (BIA Feb. 27, 2026). It applied 8 C.F.R. § 1003.18(c), the closure regulation adopted in 2024. For what has happened since, see Later developments at the end of this article.

The government asked for the pause, then ended it

DHS started removal proceedings against Ibarra-Vega, a citizen of Mexico, in 2010. On August 30, 2013, DHS itself moved to close the case administratively as an exercise of prosecutorial discretion. She did not object, and the judge granted the motion days later. She filed her U-visa petition with USCIS on May 4, 2018, more than four and a half years into the closure.

The next event the opinion reports came seven years later. On June 26, 2025, DHS moved to recalendar, saying her petition was still pending and the case should be resolved on the merits. She opposed and filed a receipt notice. The judge denied DHS’s motion on September 16, 2025, because the petition was pending.

DHS took an interlocutory appeal, meaning an appeal before any final decision on removal. The Board usually refuses those. It took this one to ensure the recalendaring rules were being applied correctly, and it decided the question de novo, with no deference to the judge’s exercise of discretion.

A pause whose rules keep changing

Administrative closure takes a case off the judge’s active calendar. It decides nothing, grants no status and, the Board repeated, is “not intended to be used to delay proceedings indefinitely.” Either side can ask to bring the case back.

Who controls that pause has swung back and forth since 2012. Until then, either party could veto closure. Matter of Avetisyan, 25 I&N Dec. 688 (BIA 2012), ended the veto and gave judges six factors to weigh. Matter of W-Y-U-, 27 I&N Dec. 17 (BIA 2017), made the primary question whether the party opposing closure had a persuasive reason for the case to go forward. The Attorney General then wiped out general closure authority in Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I&N Dec. 271 (A.G. 2018), and a later Attorney General restored it in Matter of Cruz-Valdez, 28 I&N Dec. 326 (A.G. 2021), while rulemaking proceeded.

That rulemaking produced the 2024 regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.18(c), which told judges to weigh the totality of the circumstances and said “[n]o single factor is dispositive.” The Board answered in Matter of B-N-K-, 29 I&N Dec. 96 (BIA 2025): Whether there are persuasive reasons to resolve the case on the merits remained the primary consideration, which the Board defined as “initial and important but not overriding.” It also required “some foreseeable resolution” within “a reasonably short period of time.” Matter of Cahuec Tzalam, 29 I&N Dec. 300 (BIA 2025), applied that requirement to a visa petition whose priority date sat nearly five years behind the current line.

Ibarra-Vega took those two decisions and applied them to the other end of the process: a motion to end a closure that was granted years ago.

The line for a U visa now runs decades

The factual center of the opinion is arithmetic. Congress caps U visas at 10,000 a year. When the Board decided Matter of Sanchez Sosa, 25 I&N Dec. 807 (BIA 2012), about 10,250 petitions had been pending eight months earlier, and the Board now says it was reasonable then to expect visas for all or most approvable petitions in the next fiscal year. In that world, Sanchez Sosa presumed that a prima facie approvable petition earned a continuance for a reasonable period.

By May 2018, when Ibarra-Vega filed, well over 100,000 petitions were pending. The Board concluded she would likely wait more than a decade even if eligible. The backlog has since grown to almost 250,000, and the Board’s estimate for someone filing today is more than two decades.

The Board used that arithmetic to shut down the most sympathetic argument available. The Ninth Circuit wrote in Malilia v. Holder, 632 F.3d 598 (9th Cir. 2011), that a person should not bear the cost of USCIS’s inefficiencies. The Board distinguished it: Her inability to get a visa, it wrote, “is not the result of any action or inaction by USCIS.” Congress set the number. Agency delay and visa scarcity are different problems, and, as we read the opinion, the Board treated only the first as the kind Malilia protects. As we read it, Malilia may still help where the record shows a visa is reachable and only USCIS’s processing stands in the way. Ibarra-Vega’s petition was also still pending, and that did not help her, because nothing showed a visa would follow within a short time. The Board applied the same time limit to waiting for USCIS to decide a petition.

A receipt proves only that she filed

Ibarra-Vega’s evidence came down to one document. She filed a USCIS receipt and nothing to show she qualified. She offered no bona fide determination, USCIS’s early screening decision on a petition, and no notice placing her on the U-visa waiting list. Cahuec Tzalam had already said that missing proof of prima facie eligibility “strongly militates against” closure.

Her lawyer’s brief said she expected USCIS to decide the petition in one or two years. The Board called that “speculation” and repeated the familiar rule that a lawyer’s statements are not evidence.

The Board then explained that better paperwork alone would not have saved this closure. Even assuming the petition was approvable, nothing in the record showed a visa would come within a reasonably short time. It leaned on earlier decisions rejecting delay for a remote visa, including Matter of Quintero, 18 I&N Dec. 348 (BIA 1982), which refused to let even an approved petition hold up deportation until a visa number arrived.

The factors in the regulation lined up the same way. DHS’s interest in reaching the merits was a persuasive reason to proceed. Almost 13 years had passed with no lawful status. Her reason for opposing recalendaring rested on speculation. Only the anticipated outcome was neutral, because the Board could not tell from this record whether she would win or lose once the case resumed.

The Board set a six-month presumption

The Board’s broadest move sits near the end of its opinion. The “reasonably short period” requirement, it wrote, governed both the first decision to close and a later decision to recalendar. It applied whatever the party is waiting for: a visa petition, a waiver, a visa number or a change in personal circumstances. And then the number: “[A]bsent unique circumstances specific to an individual case, administrative closure in excess of 6 months is presumptively unreasonable.”

The Board said what counts as a reasonably short period “may vary based on the ‘totality of the circumstances’” and the factors “relevant to the particular case,” but it gave no example of a unique circumstance. It did show, two weeks later, how much work the presumption can do. Matter of Medina Madrid, 29 I&N Dec. 514 (BIA 2026), recalendared another case closed in 2013 at DHS’s request. The respondent there wanted more time to seek a provisional unlawful presence waiver, and the Board set the roughly 28-month processing time for that waiver beside the six-month presumption. It also added a factor that fits Ibarra-Vega’s timeline: When a case was closed for some other reason and the respondent later relies on a benefit filing, the gap between closure and filing counts, and a gap that exceeds a temporary period makes further closure “heavily disfavored.”

The older language points the other way, and a lawyer should know it. Avetisyan described closure as suited to an event outside the parties’ control that “may not occur for a significant or undetermined period of time.” B-N-K- quoted the first half of that sentence and stopped before those words. The Ninth Circuit quoted the whole sentence in December 2025, in Ruiz v. Bondi, discussed below.

The Board called it amnesty

The opinion’s strongest language concerns power. Closing a case over DHS’s objection to wait for a remote visa, the Board wrote, effectively “amount[s] to a decision not to apply the Nation’s immigration laws at all.” Those words come from Hernandez-Serrano v. Barr, 981 F.3d 459 (6th Cir. 2020), the one circuit decision that upheld Castro-Tum. As Cruz-Valdez recounts, the Third, Fourth and Seventh Circuits had rejected it, and the Sixth Circuit itself later allowed closure for people seeking a provisional waiver. The Board held that judges have “no authority to use administrative closure as a de facto extra-statutory form of relief that effectively grants amnesty to thousands of removable aliens because they may be eligible for a visa sometime in the future.” It tied that view to DHS’s control over prosecutions and warned of separation-of-powers problems if closure works as a form of relief Congress never provided.

One footnote softens the picture. It recognizes that DHS can defer enforcement against people eligible for a U visa but for the cap. So the protection the Board described belongs to the agency and depends on a USCIS eligibility finding, which Ibarra-Vega had not shown. Another footnote points the other way. The Board wrote that closure used to end cases permanently may raise a major-questions problem, said Congress has not given judges power to use closure as a form of amnesty, and told the parties they may address constitutionality on remand. It did not decide that question.

What a California case must also check

California sits in the Ninth Circuit, and two of its decisions matter here. Gonzalez-Caraveo v. Sessions, 882 F.3d 885 (9th Cir. 2018), held that the court can review closure decisions because Avetisyan’s factors supplied a meaningful standard. It also rejected the idea that closure intrudes on DHS’s enforcement role, stating that letting judges decide closure “does not encroach on the Department’s role in instituting proceedings.” That is a very different view from the one Ibarra-Vega took, and it came from the court that reviews California removal orders.

Ruiz v. Bondi, 163 F.4th 586 (9th Cir. 2025), cuts both ways. The court reviewed a closure denial for abuse of discretion, on a petition from a final removal order, so, as we read the posture, a person whose closure ends generally litigates that question later. It set out the 2024 factors, but judged the Board’s decision under W-Y-U-’s primary-consideration test because that test governed when the Board ruled. It described that test as since superseded by the regulation, a reading at odds with B-N-K-, which Ruiz does not mention. It also upheld denial of closure where closure was not needed for the waiver the petitioner wanted. Ninth Circuit briefing should address that tension directly.

What the remand reopens

The Board recalendared the case and sent it back. Recalendaring is not a removal order. The Board said Ibarra-Vega may be able to establish eligibility for relief the judge can grant, “[o]r she may be ordered removed,” and it expressed no opinion on which. Her U-visa petition is a separate matter that stays with USCIS.

That separation has teeth. Under 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(c)(1)(ii), a final removal order does not bar a U petition, but filing one has no effect on ICE’s authority to carry out the order. A stay must be requested separately. Subsection (d)(2) says USCIS will grant deferred action or parole to petitioners on the waiting list, which is why the waiting-list notice she did not offer could matter so much.

If your closed case is called back

• Your address with the court. A case closed for years can outlast several moves, and under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(2)(B) no written hearing notice is required for a person not in detention who failed to give the required address. A missed hearing can lead to a removal order entered in your absence. Check your address now, and treat any new notice as a real hearing date.
• The closure order. Find who asked for it, when and why. Medina Madrid counted the time between closure and filing against the respondent.
• A plan that does not depend on closure. Ibarra-Vega treats closure beyond six months as presumptively unreasonable absent unique circumstances. The basis for your closure order also matters, for the reasons in Later developments. Prepare for the case to go forward, and treat any request to stay closed as one argument, not the plan.
• Everything beyond the receipt. Collect the full petition and any bona fide determination, waiting-list notice, deferred-action notice and work permit. The Board faulted Ibarra-Vega for offering no proof of eligibility, bona fide determination or waiting-list placement.
• A dated, documented timeline. A lawyer’s estimate did not count here. Use your filing date and USCIS notices, and be ready to say what specific event would occur and when.
• What the judge can actually grant. Once a case resumes, the hearing is about removability and relief the court can decide. Identify that relief early, separately from the USCIS track.
• Your stay options. If a final order is possible, plan for a stay request now. A pending U petition will not stop removal by itself.

Later developments

The sections above state the law as of March 17, 2026. Two later events change how a closed case should be handled today.

On June 22, 2026, Texas sued in federal court in Wichita Falls to challenge the 2024 rule, Efficient Case and Docket Management in Immigration Proceedings, 89 Fed. Reg. 46,742 (May 29, 2024). The Justice Department joined a motion for consent judgment the same day, and the court entered it that day. The judgment in Texas v. Department of Justice, No. 7:26-cv-00070-O (N.D. Tex. June 22, 2026), declared the rule contrary to law, vacated it, and declared that no statute authorizes immigration judges to close or suspend a case indefinitely. It also barred the Department from issuing rules that let judges close removal cases without reaching the merits unless a statute expressly allows it.

Baltimore, Columbus, New Haven and Centro Legal de la Raza moved to intervene so they could appeal. The district court denied intervention on August 21, 2026, finding no standing. That order said that, at most, the judgment’s direct consequence “is that cases that are currently closed may be recalendared.” The court denied a stay on September 2, 2026. The Fifth Circuit denied a stay and summary reversal on September 29, 2026, in Texas v. United States, No. 26-10794 (5th Cir. Sept. 29, 2026) (unpublished order). Those rulings decided only the two motions, not the appeal from the denial of intervention. That is the latest order we have reviewed.

Ibarra-Vega applied section 1003.18(c) in February 2026, four months before the judgment, so its factors describe what the Board applied then. The current standard is unsettled. Quintero does not depend on the 2024 rule, and L. Ramirez, discussed below, reaffirmed it. W-Y-U- and Avetisyan are less secure: Castro-Tum overruled both, and Cruz-Valdez restored both only while rulemaking proceeded. Cahuec Tzalam then said the regulations had superseded Avetisyan. The regulations as they stood before 2024 offer no clear fallback: Cruz-Valdez recounts a 2020 rule that effectively codified Castro-Tum and was preliminarily enjoined. With the regulation vacated, the force of Ruiz’s statement that it superseded W-Y-U- is itself open. A respondent answering a motion to recalendar should be ready on both fronts: the factors the Board used in Ibarra-Vega and the judge’s authority to keep the case closed at all.

Some things did not change. As we read the judgment, a closure under a separate regulation or court-approved settlement is different: The judgment vacated the 2024 rule, not those authorities, though its statement about statutory authority may be raised against them. Check which one your closure order relies on. The August 21 order also said the judgment “does not affect the U visa certification process,” which “remains available to aliens who face active removal proceedings.” Medina Madrid is less certain. It was decided before the judgment and built its point about the gap between closure and filing on a factor in the vacated regulation, section 1003.18(c)(3)(ii)(D). As we read it, the point may still be argued.

A continuance is no longer an easy substitute. Matter of L. Ramirez, 30 I&N Dec. 157 (BIA Oct. 16, 2026), overruled the Sanchez Sosa presumption, the comparison point Ibarra-Vega had used. It rested chiefly on Matter of L-A-B-R-, 27 I&N Dec. 405 (A.G. 2018), and Quintero, and drew on Ibarra-Vega’s account of wait times. Judges now apply the L-A-B-R- balancing test, keeping in mind “that good cause does not exist if visa availability is remote.” Our L. Ramirez analysis explains that test, and our guide to continuances on a pending U visa covers what to assemble.