Godoy Soto: An Unchallenged Notice Finding Undermined the Notario Claim

A claim that a notario failed to tell someone about a hearing must be assessed against the notice the person actually received and the issues preserved on appeal. In Godoy Soto v. Blanche, No. 25-2158 (9th Cir. Oct. 26, 2026), an unchallenged actual-notice finding and unsupported allegations about a non-attorney adviser defeated an effort to reopen an in absentia deportation order.

The Ninth Circuit denied the petition in part and dismissed it in part. Its four-page memorandum is designated unpublished and nonprecedential except as Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 permits. It illustrates how preservation and evidence can decide a reopening case before the applicant obtains consideration of the underlying relief.

The court reviewed the reopening denial

Maritsa Guada Godoy Soto, a citizen of El Salvador, asked to reopen deportation proceedings and rescind an order entered when she did not attend. The immigration judge denied the motion, and the Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed her appeal.

Because the BIA conducted its own review, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the BIA’s decision, including any part of the judge’s reasoning it expressly adopted. Denials of reopening are reviewed for abuse of discretion; legal and due-process questions receive independent review. The memorandum states these standards in Godoy Soto.

The opinion describes a motion involving an older deportation proceeding. It provides limited background about the original hearing. Its discussion therefore should not be converted into a general filing-deadline guide for every modern removal case.

The actual-notice finding remained in place

The BIA found that Godoy Soto had waived a challenge to the immigration judge’s finding that she had actual, sufficient notice. Her federal opening brief then failed to challenge the BIA’s waiver ruling. The Ninth Circuit treated that challenge as forfeited.

Those were two distinct preservation problems: The issue was lost before the Board, and the federal brief failed to attack the Board’s reason for treating it as lost. Repeating the underlying notice complaint could not displace that procedural ruling.

With actual notice established for its review, the court upheld the agency’s exceptional-circumstances analysis. The motion offered only vague allegations that a notario had not told her about the hearing. The court relied on Singh-Bhathal v. INS, 170 F.3d 943, 946–947 (9th Cir. 1999), involving a person who received notice but followed a non-attorney’s advice not to attend.

The due-process theory also lacked the necessary evidence

The court separately considered the alleged notario interference under a due-process theory. It assumed for purposes of its analysis that the claim could proceed despite the rule that voluntary and knowing reliance on a non-attorney generally will not support an ineffective-assistance due-process claim, described in Hernandez v. Mukasey, 524 F.3d 1014, 1020 (9th Cir. 2008). It then identified a factual failure: The motion contained no evidence that the notario interfered with the actual notice she received.

The motion also failed to comply with the procedural requirements of Matter of Lozada, 19 I&N Dec. 637, 639 (BIA 1988). That framework calls for an affidavit detailing the agreement and conduct, notice to the challenged counsel with an opportunity to respond (with the response submitted, or a report that counsel failed or refused to respond), and an explanation of whether an appropriate disciplinary complaint was filed and, if not, why not. The panel emphasized their importance where the existing record does not make ineffective assistance clear and obvious. It cited Rodriguez-Lariz v. INS, 282 F.3d 1218, 1227 (9th Cir. 2002), and Tamang v. Holder, 598 F.3d 1083, 1090 (9th Cir. 2010), in explaining that evidentiary and procedural problem.

The actual assumption and the grounds for rejecting the claim appear in Godoy Soto. The panel resolved the claim on the absence of interference evidence and procedural compliance after making that express assumption.

Discretionary reopening and underlying relief were separate

The court dismissed the challenge to the agency’s refusal to reopen on its own motion. The agency had exercised discretion after finding no exceptional circumstances. Applying Lona v. Barr, 958 F.3d 1225, 1234 (9th Cir. 2020), the panel lacked jurisdiction because the agency’s decision rested on discretion, rather than a mistaken belief that the law prohibited reopening or made exercising discretion futile.

The panel also upheld the agency’s decision to stop after denying reopening, rather than adjudicate the underlying application for relief from deportation. The procedural denial made that merits inquiry unnecessary. The court denied the motion to stay removal as well.

What makes the decision useful

The case directs attention to three different records: The hearing notice, the evidence of the adviser’s conduct and the arguments actually presented at each review level. A compelling account of bad advice can still fail if it never explains how the conduct affected a notice the applicant personally received.

Preserve messages, payment receipts and contemporaneous notes, but also obtain the actual motion, exhibits, agency orders and briefs. The companion Insight addresses how to identify what the evidence of notario interference actually shows.