Fausner: Carrying Flight Bags Did Not Convert a Commute into Business Travel

Fausner v. Commissioner, 413 U.S. 838 (1973) (per curiam), affirmed the disallowance of a pilot’s automobile commuting expenses. The pilot carried an overnight bag and a flight bag, but would have driven to work without them. That factual concession defeated the effort to treat the ordinary cost of the trip as a deductible business expense.

The claimed expense was the commute itself

The taxpayer drove approximately eighty-four miles round trip between home and his regular place of employment. He sought to deduct the automobile expense under section 162 because the bags accompanied him. The Tax Court disallowed the deduction, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed.

The Supreme Court granted review and affirmed in a brief opinion. It treated the trip’s personal commuting character as controlling on the record presented. The taxpayer’s transportation choice did not result from a demonstrated need to incur additional expense for the bags: He would have made the same car trip anyway. Fausner, 413 U.S. at 838–39.

Work-related baggage did not change the baseline cost

The Court read section 262’s treatment of personal expenses as preventing the claimed conversion of ordinary commuting costs into a business deduction merely because job-related items were carried. A work purpose attached to the items did not establish a deductible character for the preexisting transportation expense.

The distinction matters because two propositions can be true together: Equipment may be necessary for work, and the employee’s normal travel to the workplace may remain personal. The opinion does not resolve the transportation question by asking only whether the employer required the items or whether they were useful on the job.

The Court left room for genuinely additional expense

The opinion recognized that additional expense incurred to transport tools or materials could support an allocation between personal and business amounts. It found no such allocation justified on this record. Fausner, 413 U.S. at 839. The result therefore does not establish that equipment transportation can never produce a deductible expense.

Nor does the reservation authorize a standard percentage based on the space a bag occupies. The analytical difference is an actual added cost, supported by evidence, rather than an incidental work-related use of a trip the taxpayer would make anyway. Whether a particular added charge satisfies all deduction requirements must still be resolved separately.

Justice Blackmun would have set the case for oral argument. The Court’s disposition remained an affirmance of the judgment denying the claimed automobile deduction; it did not remand for a new allocation of the pilot’s costs.

Modern Statutory Application

Section 67(h) now disallows miscellaneous itemized deductions for tax years beginning after 2017. A present-day employee therefore cannot infer a deduction from a 1973 commuting decision; any separate statutory treatment must be identified. Section 262 supplies the personal-expense limitation, while IRS Publication 463 distinguishes ordinary commuting from additional hauling costs.

Fausner addresses an established commute and the unsuccessful effort to recharacterize its existing cost because bags came along.

For a current file, separate three questions: the character of the underlying trip, proof of an incremental equipment-transport expense, and a statutory basis to deduct that expense. The pilot lost on the unchanged commute presented to the Court. A materially different record requires its own analysis, not a general promise that transporting work equipment creates a tax deduction.

“But no such allocation can be made here.”

Fausner, 413 U.S. at 839

For taxpayers, the practical implication is to document an actual incremental expense and a current deduction provision; a work-related bag alone proves neither.

Frequently asked questions

Did the pilot incur the car expense because of his bags?

The record established that he would have driven even without them, which was central to the result.

Did the Court forbid every deduction for transporting tools?

No. It recognized the possibility of additional transport expense but found no proper allocation on this record.

Does Fausner establish that an employee can deduct the expense today?

No. Current eligibility rules, including section 67(h) and any specific statutory exception, must be considered separately.

Use the practical records guide: Tools in Your Car: Separate Commuting from Added Transport Costs.