Elizondo Urzua: A Green-Card Holder Who Says He Was “Waved Through” Must Prove It

A car leaves a border inspection lane as an officer gestures from a booth.

A noncitizen who says he was “admitted” years ago because a border officer waved his car through must prove it when the entry date decides whether he can be deported. In Elizondo Urzua v. Blanche, No. 25-604 (9th Cir. Nov. 17, 2026), the Ninth Circuit held that 8 U.S.C. § 1361 places that burden on the noncitizen and denied review: A secondhand account of being waved through while asleep did not compel a finding of a 1994 admission.

Judge VanDyke wrote for the majority; Judge Gould dissented.

A ride across the border in 1994

Alvaro Elizondo Urzua, a citizen of Mexico, says he came to the United States in 1994, at 13. After a festival in Tijuana, he rode north with friends, carrying no entry papers. He fell asleep in heavy traffic near the border and woke up in Los Angeles. His friends told him that “an officer asked the driver … a few questions, then let the car pass through” (pages 5 and 6).

He grew up in California and became a permanent resident in December 2015 under 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i), which allows adjustment by certain people who entered without inspection, based on a visa application his father had filed before May 2001. His application said at least three times that he had entered without inspection, and he certified that he understood it (pages 6 and 7).

In 2023 he pleaded no contest to a 2017 rape of an unconscious person and was sentenced to three years in prison (page 7).

Why the date of admission decided the case

The government charged him under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i), which makes deportable a person convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude “committed within five years . . . after the date of admission” that carries a possible sentence of a year or more. Only the admission date was disputed: 2015 put the 2017 crime within five years; 1994 did not (page 11).

His theory rested on Matter of Quilantan, 25 I&N Dec. 285 (BIA 2010). “Admission” means lawful entry “after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer,” which Quilantan held requires “only procedural regularity”; there, a passenger was admitted when an inspector questioned only the driver and “waved the car through the port of entry” (pages 11 and 12). Our Lau analysis explains why the admission label matters.

What the immigration judge and the Board found

Elizondo Urzua moved to terminate. His father and sister testified that he told them the story in 1994. Two immigration attorneys declared that it is “not uncommon” for lawyers to miss wave-through admissions, which could explain the “without inspection” statements. He also offered border-security reports and changes to the adjustment form (pages 7 to 9).

The immigration judge made no adverse credibility finding but found him removable: He could not disown his forms without following Matter of Lozada, the claimed attorney error was speculative, and his account was hearsay. The Board dismissed the appeal, saying that under Quilantan he had to prove “by clear and convincing evidence that he was lawfully inspected and admitted” and had offered no sworn statements or testimony from the friends in the car (pages 9 and 10).

Section 1361 puts the burden on the noncitizen

Section 1361 provides that in “any removal proceeding . . . against any person, the burden of proof shall be upon such person to show the time, place, and manner of his entry into the United States.” He therefore had to prove both the time (1994) and the manner (a procedurally regular entry through a port of entry) (page 13). The majority rested the burden on section 1361, not on Quilantan, and asked only whether the record compelled a finding of a 1994 admission.

He relied on Iran v. INS, 656 F.2d 469 (9th Cir. 1981), which said that § 1361 applies “only in deportation proceedings which involve illegal entry.” The majority called that statement “broad, unreasoned dicta.” Iran was a visa-overstay case in which the government agreed the entry was lawful. The 1924 rule reflects that the noncitizen is “normally the party best placed to prove these facts,” and Congress kept it in 1996. Most important, Veneracion v. INS, 791 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1986), decided after Iran, said that Iran’s holding was only that the presumption “did not operate in that case” and that the court “did not have occasion to define the ‘illegal entry’ statement,” and it applied the rule to an entry without a valid visa or other authorization. Because the time, place and manner of this entry were “relevant here to whether Elizondo Urzua is deportable,” section 1361 applied (pages 13 to 19).

Why his evidence fell short

With the burden on him, the record did not compel a finding of a procedurally regular 1994 entry. His account was hearsay from friends he could not name, his family’s was double hearsay, and the rest was general. “None of this evidence says anything about whether Elizondo Urzua presented himself for inspection when he was allegedly waved through the border in 1994.” His adjustment papers, saying repeatedly that he entered without inspection, cut against his account (pages 19 and 20).

The court set aside whether strict Lozada compliance was required to disown those statements. It was enough that the Board “fairly questioned why Elizondo Urzua had not provided direct evidence from his former attorney who allegedly erred in filling out his forms” (page 20). Our Melgar analysis covers the Lozada requirements.

The dissent: Iran was binding

Judge Gould would have treated Iran as binding. Quoting the test for dicta in Judge Kozinski’s separate opinion in United States v. Johnson, 256 F.3d 895, 915 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc), he wrote that Iran’s reading of § 1361 was not made “casually and without analysis”; the Iran panel devoted several paragraphs to it, and it was essential to the decision. Because he viewed the proceeding as one that did not involve illegal entry, he would have sent the case back for the Board to decide whether the government met its burden of proving removability (page 21).

What this means for a wave-through claim

Our reading: In the Ninth Circuit, a person who relies on a wave-through entry to move an admission date that decides removability must prove it. The proof that matters is specific to the crossing: testimony or sworn statements from the people in the car, any government entry record, and an explanation, ideally from the preparer, for earlier applications that said otherwise. In presenting that proof, section 1361 entitles him to production of his visa or other entry document, if any, and other nonconfidential records about that entry held by immigration authorities.

Status as of November 20, 2026: The Ninth Circuit’s public opinions list showed no amended opinion or order granting rehearing in this case. The ordinary time to seek rehearing had not yet run.

Does your case turn on when you were admitted?

Bring your green-card application and approval, any I-94 or entry record, the notice to appear and the names of anyone who crossed with you. We can review what the record shows about your entry and what evidence could still be gathered. Call (949) 343-9735 or email office@mishrax.com.