Doe v. Maybourne: Pregnancy and Gender Harassment Can Keep a California Case Out of Arbitration

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A California employee who alleges harassment because of her pregnancy or her gender can use the federal Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act (EFAA) to keep her case in court, even when nothing sexual was said or done. The limit is the complaint: It must describe conduct that state law treats as sexual harassment, and federal pleading rules decide whether it does.

That is the holding of Doe v. The Maybourne Beverly Hills Operator, LLC, No. B341400 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 17, 2026), a published decision of the Second Appellate District, Division Seven. Justice Stone wrote the opinion, joined by Presiding Justice Martinez and Justice Feuer. The court affirmed the order denying the hotel operator’s motion to compel arbitration, so Doe’s whole case against the hotel operator stays in Los Angeles Superior Court.

“Career woman” comments, a closed promotion and a firing

Doe was a guest reception manager at The Maybourne Beverly Hills from 2015 to January 2024. In June 2020 she signed an agreement to arbitrate any dispute related to her employment under the Federal Arbitration Act. The facts below are her allegations, which the court accepted as true at this stage.

After she disclosed her first pregnancy in October 2020, she was told that she “would not be able to be a career woman once she had children and related gender responsibilities.” She applied for director of front office; the hotel closed the position without interviewing her and hired a man. Back from her second maternity leave, she was told there was “no room for her to grow professionally.” In December 2023 a regional director told her “that she was a mother and that her first priority would always be her children,” suggested she look elsewhere, and said there was “no point in asking” for a raise. When she pressed Human Resources, the human resources director falsely insinuated she was having a sexual relationship with a coworker. She was suspended without pay and fired five days later.

She sued for harassment based on sex, gender and pregnancy, sex discrimination, retaliation and wrongful termination. The hotel argued that the EFAA reaches only sexual misconduct, and that she could not show severe or pervasive harassment because “[a]t most, she has alleged two comments regarding her being a mother and focusing on her children.”

The federal exception borrows California’s definition

The EFAA lets the person alleging a sexual harassment dispute refuse a predispute arbitration agreement. It defines that dispute as one “relating to conduct that is alleged to constitute sexual harassment under applicable Federal, Tribal, or State law.” The court read that text to mean what it says: The EFAA “plainly directs courts to apply the definition of ‘sexual harassment’ applicable under the particular law invoked by the plaintiff.” Because the text was clear, the court gave no weight to the hotel’s argument that Congress had only #MeToo-style sexual misconduct in mind.

Under FEHA, sexual harassment includes gender and pregnancy

Doe sued under California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act, so FEHA’s definition controlled. Government Code section 12940(j)(4)(C) provides that “ ‘harassment’ because of sex includes sexual harassment, gender harassment, and harassment based on pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions,” and that “[s]exually harassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire.” FEHA also defines “sex” to include gender and pregnancy.

The hotel read that list as separating sexual harassment from gender and pregnancy harassment. The court disagreed: The list shows how broad FEHA is, and as the California Supreme Court explained in Lyle v. Warner Brothers, it is “the disparate treatment of an employee on the basis of sex—not the mere discussion of sex or use of vulgar language—that is the essence of a sexual harassment claim.” The court therefore held that an EFAA sexual harassment dispute “can include a FEHA hostile workplace claim based on harassment due to gender or pregnancy, without any lascivious acts, advances, or comments.”

Federal pleading rules decide, and Doe met the strictest one

Doe asked the court to use California’s more forgiving demurrer standard. The court declined: Section 402(b) says whether the EFAA applies “shall be determined under Federal law,” and state rules could let the same complaint win in one court and lose in another.

Federal courts disagree on the federal test: plausibility, “nonfrivolous” allegations, or the Ninth Circuit majority’s rule that the complaint need only assert the conduct is sexual harassment. The court said it is not bound by the Ninth Circuit majority and did not choose among them, because Doe’s allegations “satisfy even the most stringent Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard.”

The repeated comments about pregnancy and motherhood “reinforce the stereotype that women, and mothers in particular, are less committed and less deserving of advancement in the workplace,” and a false accusation of sex with a coworker “could also betray gender-based hostility.” The hotel called the closed promotion and ignored raises personnel decisions, which support discrimination, not harassment. Relying on Roby v. McKesson, the court answered that official actions can carry a hostile message when they form a widespread pattern of bias. Doe alleged that men held all the “key executive roles,” that she and other women were underpaid and passed over, and that her promotion and pay requests were ignored for years. The court held that the alleged “widespread pattern of excluding her and other women from upper-level positions” plausibly conveyed a “hostile message,” reinforced by the stereotype comments and the false accusation, so she plausibly pleaded an objectively hostile environment. A trier of fact may still find the conduct was not severe or pervasive; that question is for trial.

How this differs from Holland-Thielen v. SpaceX

Our analysis of Holland-Thielen v. SpaceX covers a federal appeal about how much a complaint must allege. Doe answers a different question: what counts as sexual harassment when the plaintiff sues under California law.

What this means if you signed an arbitration agreement

These points are our reading of the opinion.

For deadlines and the separate federal route, see our guide to the CRD deadline and arbitration agreements.

Signed an arbitration agreement, then harassed over a pregnancy?

Bring the agreement, your notes of each comment and when it was made, any promotion postings or raise requests, and your termination papers. Mishra X Trial Lawyers can review whether your claims fall within the EFAA and how to keep them in court. Call (949) 343-9735 or email office@mishrax.com.