Chmukh: A Refugee, a Stolen Car and an Aggravated Felony

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Vitaliy Chmukh came to the United States from Ukraine as a refugee in 2001. Years later, he and a friend used a stolen vehicle to steal packages from porches. He pleaded guilty to possession of a stolen vehicle in Washington and served 38 months of a 43-month sentence. In Chmukh v. Garland, 124 F.4th 670 (9th Cir. 2024), the Ninth Circuit held that the conviction was an aggravated felony and, over a partial dissent, that the agency did not err in finding it a particularly serious crime. The ruling closed off asylum and withholding of removal for a person who had lived here for more than two decades.

How the court compares a state crime

An aggravated felony is a crime on the immigration statute’s list at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43). A noncitizen convicted of one after admission is deportable, and the definition includes a “theft offense (including receipt of stolen property)” with a sentence of at least one year. Courts use the categorical approach. They compare the elements of the state crime with the generic federal offense, meaning the offense as commonly understood, and look at the statute, not at what the person did. If the state statute “sweeps more broadly,” as the court put it, quoting an earlier case, the conviction does not count.

Generic receipt of stolen property, under the court’s earlier decision in United States v. Flores, 901 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2018), has three elements: possession or similar conduct, knowledge or belief that the property was stolen, and intent to deprive the owner. As the Chmukh court described that decision, Flores held that California’s stolen property statute is a categorical match with the generic offense. The court applied the same analysis to Washington’s statute, RCW § 9A.56.068. It reasoned that both offenses require possession of stolen property and actual knowledge that it was stolen, and that actual knowledge carries with it the intent to deprive the owner. Because the conviction is an aggravated felony, the court said, he is ineligible for discretionary relief such as asylum.

Two overbreadth arguments that failed

A state law is overbroad when it reaches more conduct than the generic offense. Chmukh argued that Washington’s knowledge element was “watered down” because a jury could presume “actual knowledge by a finding of constructive knowledge.” The court answered that Washington requires actual knowledge, though a jury may find it from circumstantial evidence. It said Chmukh had not explained how the generic offense disallows that kind of proof. What matters, it said, is that both require the same fundamental mental state, and whether the generic offense considers circumstantial evidence of actual knowledge is irrelevant.

He also pointed out that Washington’s definition includes “dispose of,” which the generic offense does not list. The Ninth Circuit quoted the Washington Supreme Court in State v. Tyler, 422 P.3d 436 (Wash. 2018), as saying that the statute’s five terms (receive, retain, possess, conceal, dispose of) are “merely facets of the same criminal conduct,” and that it is “hard to imagine” disposing of a stolen vehicle without also possessing it at some time. The court said the categorical approach “is not an invitation to apply ‘legal imagination’ to the state offense,” quoting Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (2013). It concluded that no legally significant distinction separates the two definitions, and that there was no realistic probability Washington would apply its statute outside the generic definition.

The particularly serious crime finding

A “particularly serious crime” bars withholding of removal, the protection against being sent to a country where the person would face persecution. For offenses like Chmukh’s, with a sentence of more than one but less than five years, the court said the Board of Immigration Appeals, the agency appeals body, has discretion. It first asks whether the elements potentially bring the crime into a category of particularly serious crimes, then considers the type of sentence and the circumstances to see whether they justify a presumption of danger to the community. Because the conviction was an aggravated felony, the court could review that finding only for legal error.

The court rejected four objections. Relying on Bare v. Barr, 975 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2020), which it described as involving a common federal crime, the court said the failure to list the elements was not error. It reasoned that an aggravated felony is among the crimes most likely to be particularly serious, and that this crime has simple elements, which the agency recited, and that the agency referenced facts going to each. Chmukh also pleaded guilty to heroin possession from a separate incident. The agency mentioned that offense, but the court said nothing in the record suggested it was part of the analysis. The agency could find that he knew the vehicle was stolen despite his contrary testimony, the court said, because the conviction required actual knowledge and his own admissions established it. And, citing Konou v. Holder, 750 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2014), the court said it was enough that the agency addressed the nature and circumstances of the conviction and the type of sentence. Omitting a specific discussion of danger to the community “is not error,” the court held, when those considerations are addressed. It relied on its description of Gomez-Sanchez v. Sessions, 892 F.3d 985 (9th Cir. 2018): the statute requires no separate determination of dangerousness, and a person convicted of a particularly serious crime is considered a danger to the community.

Chmukh’s claim under the Convention Against Torture was waived, the court said, because his opening brief did not address it.

The separate opinions

Judge VanDyke, concurring, urged the full court to reconsider Abebe v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc), decided by an expanded panel. As Judge VanDyke described it, Abebe treats an issue as exhausted, or properly preserved at the agency, even if the person never raised it with the Board, when the Board adopts the immigration judge’s decision by summary affirmance. Judge Sanchez agreed the conviction was an aggravated felony but dissented on the particularly serious crime ruling, arguing that the Board violated its own precedent by skipping the threshold elements inquiry and failing to explain the danger presumption.

What this means for California readers

For representation, see our deportation defense practice.

Considering a plea, or facing removal after one?

Bring the charging papers and plea records. We can compare the statute of conviction with the immigration definitions before anything is decided. Call (949) 343-9735 or email office@mishrax.com.