Chittick: Reporting an Injury Was Different From Knowing Benefit Rights

If you tell your employer about an accident and are told it is not covered by workers’ compensation, you may seek treatment on your own without realizing you can challenge that answer. A later claim that you waited too long can then feel especially unfair. The evidence needs to show both what the employer knew about the injury and what you actually knew about your rights.

That distinction mattered in Chittick v. Heart of Humanity Home Health Care Services, Nos. ADJ14742380, ADJ14742854 (WCAB Sept. 13, 2022). The Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board denied the employer’s petition for reconsideration and adopted the judge’s explanation for rejecting its limitations defense. Training on reporting accidents did not establish that this nurse actually knew her workers’ compensation rights.

The dispute started with whether the employer was told

Lynn Chittick was a registered nurse who traveled to clients’ homes. She was involved in a motor-vehicle accident in December 2019. The parties disputed whether it occurred while she was traveling to an appointment and whether she reported it to the employer. The judge found an injury arising out of and occurring in the course of employment.

Chittick testified that she first tried to telephone the company’s chief executive after the accident, then called Barbara Clark, who had handled scheduling. Clark supported her account of receiving the call. The employer’s witnesses disputed receiving notice.

The testimony discussion in Chittick makes the evidentiary problem clear: No call logs, telephone records or other documents had been submitted to establish whether the call occurred. The judge therefore evaluated the competing testimony and explained why he found Chittick and Clark more persuasive.

Employer knowledge can matter even without formal written notice. Labor Code section 5402(a) recognizes specified employer knowledge of an injury or injury claim as equivalent to the notice required by section 5400. Proving that knowledge remains a factual task. Written confirmation, available telephone records and witness accounts can help establish what was communicated.

The judge explained why the testimony was persuasive

The judge identified concrete contradictions in the employer’s witnesses’ accounts. They described different procedures for handling injury calls: One account placed responsibility on the employee to complete an incident report; another said the call had to be transferred immediately to the chief executive. Their accounts also conflicted about paid travel between client visits.

Those differences mattered to the judge’s assessment of credibility and whether the workplace reporting system could have failed to convey Chittick’s report. He considered the witnesses’ accounts together, rather than assuming that a missing incident form settled the notice question.

There was also a separate communication. The discussion of the following day in Chittick explains that she credibly testified to telling the chief executive and director of operations about the accident then. That account remained important even if Clark’s recollection of an interruption during the first call was mistaken.

The Board gave substantial weight to the judge’s credibility findings because he had observed the witnesses. It found no evidence of sufficient substance to warrant rejecting those findings. For another worker, the useful question is which documents and firsthand testimony support the actual report of injury, including any follow-up conversations.

Knowing the reporting procedure was different from knowing her rights

Employer notice of the injury was only one part of the dispute. The employer had failed to provide notices about potential workers’ compensation benefits. It nevertheless argued that Chittick’s training gave her enough knowledge of those rights to prevent the limitations period from being paused.

The adopted report applied Reynolds v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeals Board, 12 Cal.3d 726, 730 (1974), and examined whether Chittick actually knew her rights despite the missing notices. Her own account addressed that question: She asked whether the accident could be a workers’ compensation matter and was told it was not covered. She then obtained treatment herself and stopped discussing the injuries with the employer because of that answer.

The training and knowledge analysis in Chittick distinguished knowing how to report an injury from knowing about benefits and the requirement to commence proceedings. The employer offered no evidence establishing the content of the asserted training or that it had actually taught her those rights.

The judge also distinguished Hurwitz v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board, 97 Cal.App.3d 854, 874–875 (1979), as discussed in the adopted report. There, the worker knew about the need to bring workers’ compensation proceedings within a year and deliberately refrained on advice from an attorney handling a third-party case. Chittick’s record instead showed ignorance of her rights and reliance on the employer’s statement that the accident was not covered.

The outcome therefore depended on the actual evidence of notice, knowledge and reliance. Missing employer notices do not by themselves answer every limitations question. A worker’s actual knowledge can matter, and it needs to be evaluated from what the worker received, was told and understood.

The employer’s petition also needed record support

The Board addressed another problem with the employer’s challenge. The petition referred to testimony but contained no citations to the evidentiary record. The judge’s report explained that defect before separately analyzing why the challenge also failed on its merits.

The Board’s record-citation reminder in Chittick referred to Rule 10945. The current rule’s record-reference requirements call for specific references supporting evidentiary statements and a fair presentation of material evidence. Disagreeing with a witness or the judge’s conclusion needs to be connected to the actual hearing testimony and exhibits.

The Board denied reconsideration. It reminded counsel that noncompliance could result in dismissal; the operative result in this case was a denial. The decision rested on the adopted factual and legal reasoning as well as the criticism of the petition’s presentation.

The denial preserved the injury finding

The order in Chittick denied the employer’s petition, leaving the June 2022 findings in place. The challenged finding concerned the December 2019 injury. The adopted report identified separate April 2021 injury findings that the employer’s petition did not contest.

For the disputed December injury, the judge found that the employer had timely notice and had not established its limitations defense. That allowed the industrial-injury finding to stand. The opinion’s result concerns that finding and defense; it does not specify a new disability percentage or payment amount.

Separate the two histories in your file

First, organize the evidence of what the employer learned about the injury: The original report, whom you contacted, witness recollections, messages, any available call records and follow-up conversations. Record uncertainties honestly rather than filling gaps in the account.

Next, identify what you received or were told about workers’ compensation rights. Keep the claim form, benefit notices, denial communications and the actual training materials, if available. If you relied on a statement that the injury was not covered, preserve the statement, when you heard it and what you did afterward.

Have counsel review those histories promptly alongside the injury, benefit and filing records. Labor Code section 5405 identifies a one-year period tied to specified events, while notice and knowledge can affect the analysis. A possible dispute over pausing a period is a reason to obtain a careful review, rather than wait. Our Davison analysis addresses a different record where conflicting knowledge testimony and missing treatment dates required further development.