Chamorro-Castillo: Returned Hearing Mail Required a Closer Look at Other Notice Options

The hearing notice came back undeliverable. The agency then relied on the address problem to deny reopening without determining whether another reasonable way to provide notice was available. In Chamorro-Castillo v. Bondi, No. 20-73402 (9th Cir. Jan. 13, 2026), the Ninth Circuit returned the case for that missing inquiry in a motion to reopen an in absentia removal order—an order entered when the noncitizen was absent from the hearing.

The four-page memorandum is a nonprecedential disposition under Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. It applies the intervening en banc notice decision identified in the opinion, United States v. Rivera-Valdes, 157 F.4th 978, 989 (9th Cir. 2025) (en banc). The en banc Rivera-Valdes rule is Ninth Circuit precedent. This later memorandum applies it to the particular returned-envelope record.

The address finding did not complete the notice analysis

The immigration court mailed a hearing notice to the address Jose Israel Chamorro-Castillo had provided. The envelope returned with the notation that it was not deliverable as addressed and could not be forwarded. The immigration judge found that he had not supplied a deliverable address and had made himself unreachable. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. Memorandum pages 2–3.

While the petition for review was pending, the court issued Rivera-Valdes, applying the reasonably-calculated-notice requirement from Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 226 (2006). The memorandum identifies 8 U.S.C. section 1229(a) as the written-notice requirement. It quotes the en banc rule: “Notice is not reasonably calculated under the circumstances when the Government knows its method of service was ineffective and takes no additional steps to effect notice that are reasonably available to it.” Memorandum page 2, quoting Rivera-Valdes, 157 F.4th at 989.

The earlier findings did not answer that question. They addressed the defective mailing address, but not the agency’s available options after the envelope returned. The panel therefore required the agency to make the determination called for by the intervening decision.

A possible phone contact needed findings, not speculation

The record raised a specific possible alternative. Chamorro-Castillo later obtained a deportation-notice letter. The immigration judge declined to speculate about how he obtained it, but also suggested DHS might have called the telephone number on ICE Form I-830E and told him to collect it. The judge did not find whether the government actually had another usable contact method or took reasonable additional steps to provide the hearing notice. Page 3.

The agency had to determine which additional reasonable methods were available after known failed service. The recorded phone number and possible later contact were evidence relevant to that inquiry; the judge’s speculation about a later deportation letter had not resolved what could have been done for the hearing notice. Page 3.

The petitioner preserved the particular due-process theory

The government also disputed preservation. In his motion to reopen, Chamorro-Castillo argued that due process required notice reasonably calculated to reach him and cited Jones v. Flowers. The panel found that citation directly connected to the stated immigration-notice proposition. It sufficiently alerted the BIA to the issue. Pages 3–4.

Preservation in the court of appeals was a separate question. The opening brief pointed to the telephone number already held by the immigration court and argued that it could have been used. It again connected Jones to the due-process claim. The panel applied the “specifically and distinctly” argued standard from Hernandez v. Garland, 47 F.4th 908, 916 (9th Cir. 2022), and found it satisfied. Administrative exhaustion was addressed separately under 8 U.S.C. section 1252(d)(1).

The lesson is more precise than “a citation is enough.” The motion and brief identified the notice problem and the proposed additional means of contact. Those connections allowed the later precedent to be applied to an issue already presented.

The remand required a new agency determination

The Ninth Circuit granted the petition and remanded for the BIA to decide whether reasonable additional steps were available after learning that the hearing notice had not been delivered. The BIA was to make that determination in the first instance before resolving reopening under the intervening rule. Page 4.

The address history remains part of that inquiry. The agency’s findings about the address supplied must be considered alongside what it knew after the mailing failed and what additional steps were then reasonably available.

What makes this record different from ordinary nonreceipt

An assertion that mail never arrived can raise questions about a delivery presumption and the recipient’s evidence. Here, the returned envelope supplied evidence of failed service known to the agency, and the record suggested another contact route. Those are related but distinct issues.

For a similar review, preserve the hearing notice, returned envelope, mailing entries, address submissions, forms containing contact information and any later contact history. Then identify what the agency knew and when. Our regular-mail nonreceipt guide addresses the separate evidence needed when receipt itself is disputed.

Bring the actual reopening decision and appeal papers with those records. Mishra X can assess the notice theory presented, the available evidence and the current procedural steps without assuming that a returned envelope alone determines the outcome.