Camargo-Gomez: A Vacated Conviction Did Not Reopen a Reinstated Removal Order

A coral paper panel lies beside its frame and a teal paper packet bound with a brass-colored band.

Once the government reinstates an old removal order after an unlawful return and invokes the reinstatement bar, a court decision vacating the conviction behind that order does not open the door to reopening it. In Camargo-Gomez v. Blanche, No. 23-1728, the Ninth Circuit held that 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) barred reopening of a Guatemalan man’s 1992 order even though a California court had vacated his conviction. The key limit is procedural: The bar is a rule the government must invoke, and here it did so at every stage.

The panel of Judges S.R. Thomas, Koh and Tung filed the decision on November 13, 2026. It is an unpublished memorandum disposition, not precedent under Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3, and the panel denied his petition for review and his request to stay removal.

A 1992 order and a 2018 vacatur

Rocael Camargo-Gomez’s history comes from this memorandum and the Ninth Circuit’s earlier decision in his case. A removal order was entered against him in 1992, about five years before the 1996 immigration reform law known as IIRIRA took effect in 1997, and the government removed him because of a state felony conviction. He returned unlawfully. In 1996 he applied for a green card through his marriage to a U.S. citizen; the government denied it in 2005 because of a conviction for distributing more than 30 grams of marijuana.

In 2018 a California court vacated that marijuana conviction. He applied again, this time through his U.S.-citizen daughter, who had just turned 21. In 2021 the government denied that application because he had reentered without authorization before the waiting period for permission to reapply had run. The government also reinstated his 1992 order, and he petitioned the Ninth Circuit to review that reinstatement.

What Camargo-Gomez asked for

He moved to reopen his removal proceedings, arguing that reinstating the order, now that the conviction behind it was gone, would cause a “gross miscarriage of justice” that merited reopening. The immigration judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals refused, and he petitioned the Ninth Circuit, which reviews the denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion.

The reinstatement bar

Section 1231(a)(5) provides that when the government finds a person reentered illegally after removal under an order, “the prior order of removal is reinstated from its original date and is not subject to being reopened or reviewed.” As the panel explained, reinstatement requires proof of three things: The person is a noncitizen, was subject to a prior removal order, and illegally reentered. He admitted all three, and the government had reinstated the order.

The panel relied on Cuenca v. Barr, 956 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 2020), which read the statute to “unambiguously bar reopening a reinstated prior removal order.” Cuenca explained that every person ordered removed has a right to file one motion to reopen, but under the statute a person who reenters illegally forfeits that right. The panel here still relied on Cuenca’s reading that the statute “unambiguously” bars reopening, even after the change described next.

Why it matters that the government raised the bar

Cuenca had called the bar jurisdictional. In Suate-Orellana v. Garland, 101 F.4th 624 (9th Cir. 2024), the Ninth Circuit held otherwise: The statute does not speak in jurisdictional terms, so the bar is a claim-processing rule, and earlier decisions calling it jurisdictional are no longer controlling on that point. That changes how the bar works. A claim-processing rule can be forfeited. In Suate-Orellana the government first raised section 1231(a)(5) only when the court ordered supplemental briefing, so the court held the issue forfeited and sent her case back to the Board.

A claim-processing rule is still mandatory when a party properly raises it. Camargo-Gomez’s panel applied that principle: The government had invoked section 1231(a)(5) at every stage of his proceedings, so the bar applied, and his miscarriage-of-justice argument could not get around it. Our guide to Acosta-Tapia shows the same pattern with the 30-day petition deadline: a nonjurisdictional rule, enforced because the government pressed it.

The vested-right argument was already decided

Camargo-Gomez also argued that applying section 1231(a)(5) violated his “vested right” to have his case decided under the law before IIRIRA. The panel held that argument was settled by his own earlier appeal, which is law of the case. In that 2023 decision, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the reinstatement itself and held it was not impermissibly retroactive. His 1996 application had been denied because of the conviction, and his 2018 application rested on his relationship with his daughter, which did not make him eligible until she turned 21 that year, long after IIRIRA took effect. For the Supreme Court’s retroactivity framework, see our analysis of Fernandez-Vargas.

What remains after reinstatement

Cuenca described the routes that survive the reopening bar, and they show where a vacated conviction might matter. These are our explanation of that precedent, not rulings in Camargo-Gomez’s case.

For someone with an old order and a newly vacated conviction, the order of events matters most: whether the order has been reinstated, when, whether a timely petition challenged the reinstatement, and whether the government has raised section 1231(a)(5).

An old conviction vacated, but your removal order was reinstated?

Bring the original removal order, the reinstatement notice and its date, the court order vacating the conviction, and any petition for review or fear-screening papers. Mishra X Trial Lawyers can map which challenges remain open and which deadlines apply. Call (949) 343-9735 or email office@mishrax.com.