Bonta: Content-Based Employer Speech Restrictions Failed Preliminary Review

A California law restricting adverse action for declining certain employer meetings was likely to violate the First Amendment because its operation depended on the content of the employer’s message. In California Chamber of Commerce v. Bonta, No. 25-6874 (9th Cir. Oct. 29, 2026), the Ninth Circuit affirmed a preliminary injunction against California’s enforcement of SB 399. Judge Tallman wrote the published opinion.

The law focused on political and religious communications

SB 399, codified in Labor Code section 1137, restricts adverse action against employees who decline specified employer-sponsored meetings or communications conveying the employer’s opinion about religious or political matters. Three business associations sued California officials before the statute took effect, alleging First Amendment and federal labor-law preemption violations.

The district court granted preliminary relief. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit examined standing and the plaintiffs’ likelihood of success on the constitutional claim. The posture matters: The appeal reviewed an injunction during the litigation, rather than a final judgment after trial. Bonta, official opinion at 5–8.

Mandatory all-hands meetings supplied a concrete standing basis

Western Growers described members’ plans to hold mandatory meetings about legislation affecting agricultural businesses. For standing purposes, the court accepted an arguable reading under which those intended communications were covered by the statute. An all-hands designation carries an expectation of attendance and can communicate consequences for an unexcused absence even without an express threat.

The credible threat of enforcement also mattered. The law allowed public enforcement and employee lawsuits; the court considered the resulting risk of litigation and chilled speech. Western Growers therefore established associational standing, making it unnecessary to resolve the other associations’ standing separately. Bonta at 9–15.

The content of the message determined whether the restriction applied

California argued that SB 399 regulated employment conduct rather than speech. The court rejected that characterization. Applying the law required examining whether the meeting conveyed an employer opinion about politics or religion. A comparable attendance requirement for a different subject would not trigger the same restriction.

That content distinction—and the law’s focus on employer speakers—required strict scrutiny. The opinion drew on Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 (2015), and the workplace-speech reasoning in Honeyfund.com, Inc. v. Governor, 94 F.4th 1272 (11th Cir. 2024). Labeling the regulated consequence discipline did not remove the underlying speech classification. Bonta at 18–21.

The captive-audience argument did not justify this restriction

California relied on protecting employees as a captive audience. The panel examined the settings in the cited cases: Government acting as proprietor and content-neutral restrictions on the time, place or manner of expression. Those settings differed from a content-based restriction on private employer speech.

The panel concluded that California had not supplied the compelling justification needed for this statute. It affirmed the preliminary injunction on the First Amendment ground. Because that ground supported the result, it did not reach the separately presented NLRA preemption issue. Bonta at 21–26.

The operative result is preliminary relief against state enforcement

The published appellate decision explains why the challenged law was likely unconstitutional and why the injunction should remain. Its standing discussion of private litigation is distinct from an order resolving a particular nonparty employee’s lawsuit. Applying the ruling requires the actual injunction, later orders and the claim being evaluated.

For the practical records to preserve when attendance or political agreement is disputed, see our guide to political and religious meetings at work after the injunction.