Alonso: A Returned Fee Check Required Evidence and Separate Awards to Worker and Counsel

A late attorney-fee check can raise claims belonging to different people. In Alonso v. Lazy Dog Restaurant and Bar, Nos. ADJ16419247 and ADJ16419200 (Cal. WCAB Jan. 23, 2026), the panel distinguished interest payable to counsel, a section 5814 penalty payable to the worker, and separate enforcement fees. It rescinded the award because the record did not permit a meaningful determination of the disputed payment conduct. Alonso, decision, page 4–7.

Repeated returned checks preceded a successful delivery

Alonso’s dishwasher claims settled for $95,000 on April 8, 2025. The compromise and release waived interest if paid within 30 days of the approval order’s date. The judge approved the agreement the same day.

At a later trial, the parties stipulated to unsuccessful attempts to send the attorney-fee check in May, June, July and August, using a post-office box and a home address at counsel’s request. The checks were returned for an unknown reason. A FedEx shipment on August 27 reached counsel at the home address on August 28. The stipulated account described the attempts as good-faith efforts, but supplied no explanation for the returned mail. No witnesses testified and no exhibits were submitted. Alonso, decision, page 2–3.

The judge awarded counsel $433.36 in interest, $2,137.50 under section 5814 and $1,250 in section 5814.5 enforcement fees. The defendant challenged the penalty. The panel addressed both the award’s recipients and the missing record needed to evaluate entitlement.

Interest followed the unpaid award and its condition

Labor Code section 5800 makes interest on due, unpaid awarded compensation mandatory. Interest on an attorney-fee award is payable to counsel with the fee. The panel cited Winters v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 65 Cal.Comp.Cases 1354, 1355 (2000) (writ denied), explaining that the interest compensates counsel for loss of income and earning power during the delay.

Here, the panel said interest became owing once the settlement’s 30-day waiver period expired. That legal conclusion was distinct from accepting the trial judge’s particular amount or finding the delay unreasonable on an adequate record. Alonso, decision, page 4.

The section 5814 penalty belonged to the worker

Section 5814(a) increases compensation unreasonably delayed or refused, subject to its stated maximum and the Board’s discretion to accomplish a fair balance and substantial justice. Because that increase is part of the worker’s award, the panel held it must be awarded to the worker even when the delayed payment was counsel’s fee.

The Board may separately approve a reasonable fee against the worker’s compensation under sections 4903 and 4906 and the applicable rules. The possibility of that fee does not change who owns the penalty in the first instance. Alonso, decision, page 5–6.

Enforcement fees were an additional, distinct item

Section 5814.5 addresses reasonable attorney fees incurred enforcing awarded compensation after a qualifying unreasonable delay. Those fees are additional to the section 5814 increase and payable directly to counsel. The panel also explained that receiving section 5814.5 fees does not itself relinquish the ability to request a reasonable fee against the penalty award, subject to the judge’s discretion.

That discussion separates the basis and recipient of each item. It does not supply missing proof of unreasonable conduct or automatically approve the fees requested in this case. Our analysis of Ramirez on enforcement work addresses how that separate work must be supported.

The stipulations did not explain why the delay occurred

The panel required the defendant first to establish proper mailing before invoking the mailing presumption. The worker could then offer credible contrary evidence and had to establish unreasonable conduct. The panel relied on Suon v. California Dairies, 83 Cal.Comp.Cases 1803 (2018) (en banc), and Ramirez v. Drive Financial Services, 73 Cal.Comp.Cases 1324, 1331 (2008) (en banc). Alonso, decision, page 6.

The list of mailing attempts did not explain why they failed or permit the necessary assessment. Under section 5313 and Hamilton v. Lockheed Corp., 66 Cal.Comp.Cases 473, 475–476 (2001) (en banc), the record must identify the submitted issues, stipulations and admitted evidence, and the decision must explain its evidentiary basis. The defect was this incomplete record—not a categorical prohibition on deciding matters through stipulations.

The panel returned the matter for a new decision

The WCAB granted reconsideration, rescinded the findings and award, and returned the case for development and proper admission of evidence. It expressly left the disputed merits for a new decision. This persuasive panel ruling therefore supplies a recipient distinction and an evidentiary roadmap, while the actual interest, penalty and fee awards remained for further proceedings. Alonso, decision, page 7.

The panel grounded the worker’s ownership of the section 5814 penalty in Mintzer v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1996) 61 Cal.Comp.Cases 1491. It distinguished that ownership from a reasonable, approved attorney-fee deduction, discussing sections 4903(a) and 4906 and Rules 10775, 10776 and 10778. Alonso, decision, page 4–5.

The panel also observed that failure properly to tender interest owed could give rise to additional penalty claims. That was an identified consequence for further proceedings, not a finding that another penalty had already been proved. Alonso, decision, page 4.