Matter of A-C-V-M-: Board Rejects “Guatemalan Women Without Partners” and an Imputed Political Opinion

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In a case arising in the Third Circuit, the Board of Immigration Appeals rejected an asylum claim based on membership in a group of “Guatemalan women without partners” and an imputed political opinion. Its published decision, Matter of A-C-V-M-, 30 I&N Dec. 236 (BIA 2026), was issued November 12, 2026. The group failed because the word “partner” has no clear boundary and neither the immigration judge nor the respondent explained how Guatemalan society views such women; the political opinion theory failed because nothing tied the harassment to any view about government.

The Board vacated an immigration judge’s grant of asylum and ordered the woman removed. The case arose in the Third Circuit, and the respondent, who represented herself, did not respond to the government’s appeal.

An asylum grant based on harassment

The respondent testified that a man with a motorcycle once grabbed her by the shoulder and waist and tried to get her onto the motorcycle, and that other men tried to hug her or touch her without her consent. On November 4, 2022, the immigration judge granted asylum. She found past persecution on account of membership in the group “Guatemalan women without partners” and on account of a political opinion. The respondent had withdrawn her withholding and Convention Against Torture claims, so only asylum was at stake.

The respondent had proposed two groups: “Guatemalan women” and “Guatemalan women without partners.” The immigration judge had rejected the first, and the Board agreed that it was overbroad and lacked particularity, citing its 2025 decision in Matter of K-E-S-G- and the Third Circuit’s decision in Chavez-Chilel. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appealed the rest.

Why “without partners” had no clear boundary

A particular social group must share an immutable characteristic, be defined with particularity and be socially distinct in the society in question. Reviewing the question de novo, the Board noted that the immigration judge had found all three elements without explaining any of them.

Particularity requires characteristics that give a clear benchmark for who belongs. Adding “without partners” did not supply one. The point at which someone becomes a romantic partner, the Board explained, “may change depending on who defines it.” It illustrated the point with a contrast: “[U]nlike marriage, which has a clear legal definition, ‘partner’ may refer to people who are casually dating, in a committed relationship, have a child together, or who are married.” A group whose membership turns on that label is subjective and lacks clear boundaries.

No showing of how Guatemalan society sees the group

Social distinction asks whether society in general, generally measured across the country, recognizes people sharing the characteristic as a group, even if members cannot be identified by sight. Here, the immigration judge gave no analysis and made no factual findings about how Guatemalan society perceives women without partners. The respondent offered no argument on the point. Because the applicant bears the burden of proving a cognizable group, the Board concluded that this group lacked both particularity and social distinction.

Why the political opinion finding failed

The respondent never sought asylum on a political opinion or claimed to have expressed one to the men. The immigration judge supplied the theory, reasoning that the men “could look at her as having an imputed political opinion” because she “exercised independence” by walking to school while other women stayed home and pushed forward to build a better life through education despite the harassment. Reviewing the persecutors’ motive, a question of fact, for clear error, the Board rejected the finding on two grounds.

First, the facts did not support it. Nothing in the record showed that the men knew she was walking to school, let alone that they viewed her education politically. The judge’s view that they saw her conduct as defiance of male-dominated social norms rested “only on the Immigration Judge’s speculation,” because the judge pointed to no evidence that the men saw her actions “as anything other than a rejection of their advances.”

Second, the theory failed as a matter of law. Applying its 2026 precedent in Matter of D-G-E-A- & N-G-G-E-, the Board repeated that a political opinion must be “tethered to an expression of a belief or conviction regarding a discrete cause related to the government of a country, or . . . a de facto government.” The immigration judge had relied on the Second Circuit’s decision in Hernandez-Chacon v. Barr, 948 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2020). The Board answered that the decision does not bind cases arising in the Third Circuit and that it had already explained, in D-G-E-A-, why the facts there did not tie the applicant’s actions to a belief related to the government. The Board then stated its rule: “An imputed opinion about social or societal conventions, without any relation to the government, does not qualify as an imputed political opinion.”

The result: Asylum vacated and removal ordered

With no cognizable group, no political opinion and no other protected ground identified, the respondent could not show that the harm she suffered or feared was on account of a protected ground. The Board sustained the appeal, vacated the asylum grant and ordered her removed to Guatemala.

How the decision applies in California

As a published Board precedent, A-C-V-M- will guide immigration judges nationwide. But as the Board noted, citing Matter of Anselmo, it is not bound by a circuit’s precedent outside that circuit. California cases follow Ninth Circuit law, and one line of Ninth Circuit authority bears directly on the “Guatemalan women” ruling.

The Ninth Circuit held in Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2010), that the Board erred in rejecting “all women in Guatemala” solely as too broad, and remanded for the Board to decide in the first instance whether that group qualifies. As our Menjibar Coto analysis explains, a Ninth Circuit panel, in a nonprecedential memorandum, applied Perdomo in October 2026 to vacate the Board’s ruling that “Women in Honduras” was categorically too broad, while two judges urged the full court to reconsider it. In our reading, the brief ruling in A-C-V-M- on “Guatemalan women” may therefore face Perdomo in a California case. The rejection of “Guatemalan women without partners” rests instead on the uncertain meaning of “partner” and on the absence of any analysis or argument about social perception.

The political-opinion ruling also requires Ninth Circuit analysis. In Rodriguez Tornes v. Garland, 993 F.3d 743, 751–53 (9th Cir. 2021), the court recognized feminism as a political opinion. The applicant expressly asserted equality, and her abusers responded with statements and violence enforcing her subordinate position. That evidence compelled a finding that her political opinion was at least one central reason for her persecution. This differs from the speculative motive finding in A-C-V-M-. In a California claim, the Board’s government-connection requirement must be assessed against that circuit precedent; the applicant still needs evidence of what the persecutors knew and why they acted.

For a gender-based claim, three lessons follow. Define the group with terms that have clear edges, as the Board’s marriage example shows—though that answers only particularity; social distinction must still be shown. Offer country evidence of how society views that group, as our social distinction guide explains. On motive, show what the persecutors knew and why they acted.

Building or defending an asylum claim based on gender or harassment?

Bring the asylum application, the exact groups and opinions you proposed, the immigration judge’s decision, any appeal filings and the country evidence in the record. We can review whether the group, the social-distinction proof and the evidence of motive meet the standards the Board now applies. Call (949) 343-9735 or email office@mishrax.com.