Green-Card Holder Arrested for DUI or Domestic Violence in California: What Is the Removal Risk?

An arrest alone is not a ground for deporting a lawful permanent resident; a conviction can be. A single simple DUI conviction is generally neither a crime involving moral turpitude nor an aggravated felony, but an aggravated DUI, or a conviction for domestic violence, stalking or child abuse, can make a green-card holder deportable. The plea usually decides which, so talk to an immigration lawyer before you accept one.
The arrest versus the conviction
Every ground here except the protection-order ground applies to a person who “is convicted” under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2). Under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A), a conviction is a formal judgment of guilt or, where adjudication is withheld, a finding of guilt, a guilty or no-contest plea, or an admission of “sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilt,” plus some “punishment, penalty, or restraint on the alien’s liberty” ordered by the judge.
An arrest can still affect a trip abroad: Our guide on traveling with a pending criminal charge explains why.
A simple DUI
In Matter of Lopez-Meza, 22 I&N Dec. 1188 (BIA 1999), the Board of Immigration Appeals explained why simple DUI usually lacks moral turpitude: “Simple DUI is ordinarily a regulatory offense that involves no culpable mental state requirement, such as intent or knowledge.”
A “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16 can be an aggravated felony if the court orders at least one year of confinement. In Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004), a DUI that seriously injured two people was not one, because using force against another “most naturally suggests a higher degree of intent than negligent or merely accidental conduct”; the Court listed California’s DUI-with-injury statute, Vehicle Code section 23153, among statutes that appear to require only negligence. Our Leocal analysis covers the later Dimaya decision.
When a DUI becomes a removal problem
In Lopez-Meza, the resident had two Arizona convictions for driving under the influence while knowing his license was suspended, canceled or revoked, or while on a license restricted because of an earlier DUI. The Board held that drunk driving “knowing that he or she is absolutely prohibited from driving” involves moral turpitude and found him deportable under the two-crime rule. The Ninth Circuit, which covers California, deferred to that view in Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc); our Leocal analysis covers its status today.
A crime involving moral turpitude makes a resident deportable under § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)–(ii) in two situations: one such crime committed within five years after admission (10 years for § 1255(j) residents), if a sentence of one year or longer “may be imposed”; or two such crimes, not arising out of a single scheme, at any time after admission.
Domestic violence, stalking and child abuse
Under § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), a resident convicted at any time after admission of “a crime of domestic violence, a crime of stalking, or a crime of child abuse, child neglect, or child abandonment” is deportable, with no five-year window and no minimum sentence. The ground applies to convictions after September 30, 1996. The domestic-violence branch requires a § 16 crime of violence against a current or former spouse, a co-parent, someone who lives or lived with the offender as a spouse, or another person protected by domestic-violence law.
The law on Penal Code section 273.5, corporal injury to a spouse or partner, changed this year. In United States v. Lopez, No. 24-3268 (9th Cir. July 28, 2026), the Ninth Circuit held that “§ 273.5 is not a categorical crime of violence” and overruled its earlier cases, including Banuelos-Ayon v. Holder, a 2010 removal case. The reason is intent: Section 273.5 requires only an intent to do the act, not intent or knowledge that the force is directed at another person. Lopez was a sentencing case, but the court said the same analysis applies to 18 U.S.C. § 16(a). Our reading: A section 273.5 conviction should no longer count automatically as a crime of domestic violence. Lopez does not address moral turpitude. The Ninth Circuit has held that willfully injuring a spouse under section 273.5 involves moral turpitude, but in Morales-Garcia v. Holder, 567 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2009), it held that the statute is not categorically such a crime because it also covers former cohabitants, and it sent the case back to examine the conviction record. In Vargas Cervantes v. Holder, 772 F.3d 583 (9th Cir. 2014), the court explained that the conviction record can establish the statutory victim category. It rejected using the resident’s separate testimony to fill a gap in that record. The stalking, child-abuse and protective-order grounds are separate.
Domestic battery under Penal Code section 243(e)(1) requires no injury. In Galeana-Mendoza v. Gonzales, 465 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 2006), the court held section 243(e) is not categorically a crime involving moral turpitude; it can be committed by “throwing a cup of cola on the lap of someone to whom one is or had been engaged.” In Ortega-Mendez v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 1010 (9th Cir. 2006), the court held California battery is not categorically a crime of violence because its force element, “a term of art,” requires neither injury nor violence in the usual sense. Applying it in United States v. Ochoa-Oregel, 904 F.3d 682 (9th Cir. 2018), an illegal-reentry case, the court said it “was error” to remove a resident for a crime of domestic violence based on his section 243(e)(1) conviction. Our advice: Ask counsel whether a judge may look past the code section to the plea’s wording; the plea should not admit more than the offense requires.
Protective orders
Under § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii), a resident is deportable if a court determines he or she violated the part of a protection order that protects against “credible threats of violence, repeated harassment, or bodily injury.” The resident must be subject to the order after admission, and the violation must occur after September 30, 1996. An order can be temporary or final and come from a civil or criminal court, but it must aim to prevent violent or threatening acts of domestic violence. Support and child-custody provisions are excluded. No criminal conviction is needed.
Before you plead
The Supreme Court held in Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010), that “counsel must inform her client whether his plea carries a risk of deportation.” Our advice: Before any plea, have your defense and immigration lawyers compare notes on three points:
- The exact code section. Simple and aggravated DUI differ. Neither section 273.5 nor section 243(e)(1) is now categorically a crime of violence in the Ninth Circuit, but a section 273.5 conviction can still involve moral turpitude, depending on the victim category established by the conviction record.
- The sentence. Under § 1101(a)(43)(F) and (a)(48)(B), a “term of imprisonment” of one year or more, including suspended time, makes a crime of violence an aggravated felony.
- Any protective order. A violation finding can be its own ground.
- 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) — criminal grounds of deportability
- 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F), (a)(48) — aggravated felony; conviction and sentence
- 18 U.S.C. § 16 — crime of violence
- Matter of Lopez-Meza, 22 I&N Dec. 1188 (BIA 1999)
- Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004)
- Sessions v. Dimaya, 584 U.S. 148 (2018)
- Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc)
- United States v. Lopez, No. 24-3268 (9th Cir. July 28, 2026)
- Galeana-Mendoza v. Gonzales, 465 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 2006)
- Ortega-Mendez v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 1010 (9th Cir. 2006)
- United States v. Ochoa-Oregel, 904 F.3d 682 (9th Cir. 2018)
- Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010)
Get the immigration answer before the plea is final
Call (949) 343-9735 or email office@mishrax.com to arrange a review. Have the charging document, any plea offer, any protective order and your immigration papers ready, and we can explain which deportation grounds the case could trigger and what plea and sentence terms to discuss with your defense lawyer.