Demore v. Kim: Mandatory Detention Without Bond, Upheld for the Brief Period of Removal Proceedings

If ICE is holding a family member without bond under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) because of a criminal record, Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003), is the Supreme Court decision that upheld that kind of detention. Decided April 29, 2003, it held that Congress may require such people to be detained “for the brief period necessary for their removal proceedings” without a bond hearing. That holding rested on brevity. The Court relied on figures showing that those proceedings usually ended within weeks or a few months, and Justice Kennedy, part of the five-Justice majority, wrote that a permanent resident could be entitled to an individualized hearing if continued detention became unreasonable or unjustified.
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court. Justices Kennedy, O’Connor, Scalia and Thomas joined the merits holding. Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer joined only the part holding that the federal courts had jurisdiction.
A permanent resident held without a bond hearing
Hyung Joon Kim, a citizen of South Korea, came to the United States in 1984 at age six and became a permanent resident two years later. After California convictions for first-degree burglary and “petty theft with priors,” the INS charged him as deportable and detained him pending his removal hearing. His habeas petition argued that holding him with no finding of danger or flight risk violated due process. The district court ordered a bond hearing, the INS released him on $5,000 bond, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed.
The majority treated Kim as having conceded that he fell within section 1226(c), while stressing that this did not concede he would ultimately be deported; he had applied for withholding of removal. Because he made no claim that he was wrongly placed in the mandatory category, he had sought no Joseph hearing, where a detainee can avoid mandatory detention by showing the government is substantially unlikely to prove he is covered. The Court therefore did not review whether those hearings are adequate.
On jurisdiction, the Court held that section 1226(e), as then written, did not bar Kim’s case, because he challenged the statute itself rather than a discretionary custody decision. Congress amended section 1226(e) in 2025, removing decisions to release a person or grant bond from its bar on court review.
Why the Court upheld detention during proceedings
The majority relied on the record Congress had when it enacted section 1226(c) in 1996: The INS had failed to detain many deportable criminal noncitizens, and more than 20% of those released failed to appear for their hearings. It treated detention during removal proceedings as a constitutionally valid part of that process, and held that due process does not require the least burdensome means.
It then distinguished Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), on two grounds. First, detention in Zadvydas came after removal orders, when removal was “no longer practically attainable,” while detention during proceedings serves to prevent flight before a decision. Second, that detention was indefinite, while section 1226(c) detention has a definite end. Relying on government figures, the Court said that 85% of cases ended in an average of 47 days and a median of 30, and that appeals in the other 15% averaged four months. It summarized the detention as lasting “roughly a month and a half” in most cases and “about five months” when the person appealed. Kim himself had been held about six months, partly because he requested a continuance to gather documents for his withholding application.
The figure for appealed cases later proved too low. In its November 2016 reply brief in Jennings v. Rodriguez, the government reported figures recalculated by the Executive Office for Immigration Review: For appealed cases, the immigration-judge and Board stages together took about nine months (median 272 days), not about five. The brief still argued that Demore turned on why detention occurs, not merely on its length. Neither set of figures shows how long a case takes today.
Justice Kennedy on unreasonable delay
Justice Kennedy joined the opinion in full and wrote separately. Due process, he said, requires individualized procedures to ensure some merit to the government’s charge, which the Joseph hearing apparently supplied. He added that a permanent resident “could be entitled to an individualized determination as to his risk of flight and dangerousness if the continued detention became unreasonable or unjustified.” If the government unreasonably delayed the proceedings, a court might have to ask whether detention served removal or some other purpose. He found no basis for that inference on Kim’s record.
Fifteen years later, Jennings v. Rodriguez read section 1226(c) itself to require detention until proceedings end, with no implied six-month limit, and sent the constitutional claims back to the lower courts. After Jennings, a claim that section 1226(c) custody has lasted too long is a constitutional claim, usually raised in a federal habeas petition and built on the length of custody and the reasons for it.
The other separate opinions
Justice O’Connor, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, read section 1226(e) to bar the case but joined the merits holding because a majority found jurisdiction. Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, would have required a bail hearing before an impartial decisionmaker; he disputed that Kim had conceded removability and pointed to a study finding high appearance rates among criminal noncitizens released under supervision. Justice Breyer would have read the statute to allow bail, for a person who is neither dangerous nor a flight risk, whenever a challenge to deportability is not insubstantial and not raised solely for delay.
What to gather for a prolonged-detention challenge
Begin with the current text of 8 U.S.C. § 1226. Under the 2025 Laken Riley Act, new subparagraph (c)(1)(E) extends mandatory detention to noncitizens in three inadmissibility groups: no lawful admission or parole, fraud or misrepresentation, or failure to meet entry-document requirements. It covers those who are charged with, arrested for, convicted of or admit burglary, theft, larceny, shoplifting, assault of a law enforcement officer or a crime resulting in death or serious bodily injury. The Act also moved the old witness-protection release clause from (c)(2) to (c)(4). For people arrested by ICE long after release from criminal custody, see our Nielsen v. Preap analysis.
- The charging basis. The Notice to Appear, the custody determination and the conviction or arrest records show which part of section 1226(c) ICE invokes and whether a Joseph challenge is available.
- The timeline. When custody began, the date of every hearing, which side sought each postponement, and any appeal show whether delay is attributable to the government.
- The release case. Ties to the community, prior compliance with court dates and any supervision options bear on flight risk and danger if a court orders a hearing.
Sources
- Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003) (official U.S. Reports)
- Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018) (official U.S. Reports)
- Reply Brief for the Petitioners, Jennings v. Rodriguez, No. 15-1204 (U.S. Nov. 2016)
- Laken Riley Act, Pub. L. No. 119-1, 139 Stat. 3 (2025)
Held for months under mandatory detention?
We build the custody timeline, test whether section 1226(c) applies at all, and bring federal habeas cases when mandatory detention has dragged on without a bond hearing, through our deportation defense practice. Have ready the Notice to Appear, custody papers, conviction or arrest records and every hearing notice. Call (949) 343-9735 or email office@mishrax.com.