Balasanyan: A Later Bond Denial Shifted the Habeas Inquiry to Present Custody

In Balasanyan v. Semaia, No. 5:26-cv-04634-RAO, slip op. at 4–8 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2026), ECF 14, the court denied part of a habeas petition and otherwise dismissed it without prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. It treated the April 2026 bond denial as the operative basis for continued custody and concluded that the BIA should first address reviewable challenges to that ruling. The order did not decide the merits of the asylum claim or announce that every arrest defect is cured by any later hearing.

A new custody ruling intervened after the arrest

The order describes an Armenian citizen previously released on humanitarian parole, later arrested at a September 2025 supervision check-in, and detained at Adelanto. He received a bond hearing on April 2, 2026. According to the decision attached to the government’s answer, the immigration judge found that the government established danger and flight risk, relying in part on evidence about a vehicle collision and alleged conduct afterward.

The federal order recounts those allegations as part of the custody record; it is not a criminal conviction. Balasanyan had not appealed the bond decision to the BIA. He sought immediate release through habeas and argued, among other things, that anticipated BIA delays justified excusing exhaustion. See the filed order at 1–3.

The requested release required examining current custody

“The legal basis for his continued detention is the April 2026 bond denial—not the September 2025 arrest.”

Balasanyan, slip op. at 4.

This sentence at 4 states the court’s central distinction. The petitioner attacked the absence of a hearing before his earlier arrest, but the court focused on whether his current confinement was lawful after the later bond ruling. It rejected the argument that the alleged original defect alone required immediate discharge on the record presented.

The analysis concerns habeas relief from current detention. It should not be read as deciding damages liability, approving every feature of the original arrest, or declaring that a hearing with any procedural defect necessarily satisfies due process. The later order and the specific defects asserted still matter.

The BIA could address errors in the bond ruling

The court then examined the challenges directed at the bond denial itself. It cited 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19(f) and 1003.38 and Ninth Circuit authority on prudential exhaustion. The BIA’s ability to review legal and discretionary questions and factual findings supported obtaining an administrative record and allowing correction of agency error. See id. at 4–6.

This reasoning did not rest on a claim that the BIA could invalidate the Constitution. The court explained that the agency could assess whether the immigration judge applied the appropriate factors and burden and properly evaluated the evidence; that review could provide relief without reaching a constitutional determination. It relied on Leonardo v. Crawford, 646 F.3d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 2011), and Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 988 (9th Cir. 2017).

The waiver showing was insufficient, not categorically impossible

The petitioner referred to the months a BIA appeal might take. The court found the asserted inadequacy and harm insufficiently supported and found no developed futility basis. It contrasted a decision involving evidence of harm unique to that petitioner. Thus, the order demands a supported, claim-specific explanation rather than treating predicted delay as an automatic exception. See id. at 7.

The order also rejected the particular self-incrimination argument raised concerning testimony in the civil custody proceeding. That discussion should not be converted into advice that a person with a pending criminal case has no Fifth Amendment rights. Coordinating the actual testimony issue with criminal and immigration counsel remains essential.

Practical implications and limits

The operative disposition at 8 denies the petition in part and dismisses the remainder without prejudice for nonexhaustion. This district-court order is persuasive, not controlling circuit precedent. Its description of the hearing provided to this petitioner does not establish a universal right to automatic six-month hearings for all detainees.

For families and counsel, maintain both the arrest chronology and the later custody-order record. The separate custody appeal guide explains the necessary documents. The bond and merits comparison prevents confusion with a removal appeal, while the changed-circumstances guide addresses a distinct route. Mishra X can assess the current ruling and the proposed review path without assuming that the original arrest is the only legally relevant event.

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