Immigration · Primary-source case analysis

Sessions v. Dimaya: The Crime-of-Violence Residual Clause Was Unconstitutionally Vague

By Aneeta Mishra and Timothy Chan

Published April 18, 2026

Dimaya applied constitutional vagueness principles to a civil removal statute carrying severe consequences and an aggravated-felony definition tied to a speculative ordinary-case inquiry.

California burglary convictions

Lawful permanent resident James Dimaya had two California first-degree burglary convictions. DHS charged him as removable for an aggravated felony, reasoning that the offenses were crimes of violence under section 16(b)'s residual clause. The immigration judge and BIA agreed; the Ninth Circuit did not.

The categorical ordinary-case method

The residual clause required courts to imagine the ordinary version of an offense rather than examine the person's actual conduct, then decide whether that imagined case involved a substantial risk of force. The method lacked a reliable way to identify the ordinary case.

Two indeterminacies combined

The speculative ordinary-case inquiry was paired with an imprecise substantial-risk threshold. The Court found the same combination that had made the Armed Career Criminal Act's residual clause unconstitutionally vague, producing unpredictability and arbitrary enforcement.

Disposition and boundary

The Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit and invalidated section 16(b) as incorporated into the INA. The ruling did not erase the separate elements clause in section 16(a), other aggravated-felony categories, or removability grounds that depend on different statutory language.

Key takeaways

• Identify the exact aggravated-felony clause invoked.
• Section 16(b)'s residual clause cannot support removal.
• The elements clause and other categories require separate categorical analysis.
• Obtain the conviction statute and record before assessing immigration consequences.