Employment Litigation · Primary-source case analysis

Nassar: Title VII Retaliation Requires But-For Causation

By Aneeta Mishra and Timothy Chan

Published April 26, 2026 · Updated October 17, 2026

Decision: Univ. of Texas Southwestern Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013).

Nassar, decided by the Supreme Court on June 24, 2013, separates the causation standards for Title VII status discrimination and retaliation.

A physician alleged interference after complaining

Dr. Naiel Nassar complained that a supervisor was biased and arranged employment at an affiliated hospital. He alleged that the university retaliated by blocking that position.

The motivating-factor provision addresses status discrimination

Congress expressly authorized motivating-factor liability for discrimination because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. The Court held that this provision does not extend to the separately worded retaliation section.

Retaliation uses but-for causation

A plaintiff must show that the adverse action would not have occurred in the absence of the retaliatory motive. The protected activity need not be the only cause, but it must make a determinative difference.

Disposition

The Court vacated the retaliation judgment and remanded for application of the but-for standard. It did not hold that Nassar could not prove causation on retrial.

Key takeaways

• Separate discrimination and retaliation theories.
• Ask what would have happened without the complaint, using the decision timeline and contemporaneous evidence.
• Identify all stated and unstated causes.
• Do not equate close timing alone with complete proof.